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Consumers and producers frequently rely on product ratings, such as college rankings, 
restaurant reviews and bond ratings. While much has been written about the structure of ratings 
in particular industries, little has been written on the general structure of different ratings 
industries and whether government intervention is typically needed. This paper begins that 
inquiry by examining the market structure of different ratings industries, and considering the 
circumstances under which firms that provide ratings should be regulated. The issue is 
particularly timely in light of recent calls to rethink the regulation of media ratings and credit 
ratings. 
 
We find that ratings firms in different industries share several common features. For 
example, most ratings firms operate in highly concentrated markets. Some factors that could 
make ratings markets more concentrated include economies of scale, benefits from having a 
single standard, and general agreement on what should be measured. We also find that most 
ratings firms determine their own testing standards and methods, although some industries have 
self-governing oversight bodies that offer their own accreditation standards. While the 
government regulates firm entry for a few ratings industries, this is relatively rare. The vast 
majority of ratings firms are unregulated.  
 
We analyze the question of regulation using an economic framework that focuses on the 
viability and effectiveness of a proposed policy. Despite the finding that many ratings industries 
are concentrated, our analysis suggests that market forces generally appear to be an effective 
mechanism for providing consumers and producers with useful ratings. In most cases, such 
markets do not require government intervention. Moreover, in industries characterized by rapid 
technological change the government is likely to do more harm than good by intervening. As an 
alternative to government regulation, voluntary industry oversight bodies may be effective in 
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Regulating the Raters: The Law and Economics of Ratings Firms 
Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Robert W. Hahn and Anne Layne-Farrar 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Consumers and producers frequently use product ratings. Examples include restaurant 
reviews, college ratings, and bond ratings. Scholars have studied many aspects of ratings, 
notably how asymmetries in information affect the pricing of products.
1 While much has been 
written about the structure of ratings in particular industries,
2 little has been written on the 
regulation and oversight of private sector ratings firms across industries.
3 This paper seeks to 
fill that void. Specifically, we examine the market structure of different kinds of non-
governmental ratings industries and consider whether firms that provide ratings should be 
regulated.  
The issue is particularly timely in light of recent calls to rethink regulation of media 
ratings and credit ratings. In both cases, Congress has considered changes that could involve a 
more direct role for the government or an outside body in regulating some ratings firms.
4 
                                                 
1  See e.g,. S.J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality, 
24 J.L. & ECON. 461, 461-483 (1981); A.R. Adamati & P. Pfleiderer, A Monopolistic Market for Information. 
39 J. ECON. THEORY, 400, 400-438 (1986); G. Biglaiser, Middlemen as Experts, 24 RAND J. ECON. 212, 212-
223 (1993); C. Avery, P. Resnick, & R. Zeckhauser, 89(3) The Market for Evaluations, AM. ECON. REV. 564, 
564 -584 (1999).  
2  The literature on individual ratings industries, especially for financial markets, is vast.  For just one example, see 
Richard West, Bond Ratings, Bond Yields and Financial Regulation: Some Findings, 16 J. L. & ECON. 159, 159-
168 (1973). 
3  Some papers discuss regulation, but most often it is regulation for the producers of the products or services being 
rated, not regulation of the raters themselves. See, e.g., Hans K. Hvide & Aviad Heifetz, Free Entry Equilibrium 
in a Market for Certifiers (May 25, 2001). Other papers touch on market structure for ratings firms or mention 
regulation of such firms in passing, but there is typically little more than an acknowledgement of the subject. 
See, e.g., Alessandro Lizzeri, Information Revelation and Certification Intermediaries, 30 RAND J. ECON. 214, 
214-231 (1999); Gian Luigi Albano & Alessandro Lizzeri, Strategic Certification and Provision of Quality, 42 
INT’L ECON.REV. 267, 267-283 (2001). 
4  A bill, titled Fairness, Accuracy, Inclusivity, and Responsiveness in Ratings Act of 2005, recently introduced in 
the Senate would mandate third-party review of media ratings methods. See S. 1372. 109
th Cong. (July 1, 2005), 
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:S.+1372 (last visited Nov. 29, 2005). Congress is also 
considering new regulation involving credit ratings agencies, namely The Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief 
Act of 2005. See H.R. 2990. 109 Cong. (June 20, 2005), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
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Despite important differences in the structure of these two industries, the approach to ratings in 
both areas shares some common features that could affect the usefulness of regulation. We 
analyze the appropriate role for government in regulating ratings industries by applying an 
economic framework that focuses on the viability and efficiency of a proposed policy.  
Three key questions need to be addressed before considering regulation or oversight of 
any particular industry. First, a critical question is whether there is a significant market failure. 
That is, are there fundamental problems with the way the market operates that lead to an 
undesirable economic outcome? Such problems could arise as a result of market power, limited 
access to information, or externalities.
5 Second, a practical question is whether a viable plan 
exists for addressing the failure. The question of viability might seem obvious; however, in a 
surprising number of situations, policymakers fail to ask whether the proposed policy 
intervention is workable, or whether it is designed to achieve the desired outcome.
6 Third, a key 
economic question is whether the benefits from a regulatory policy are likely to outweigh the 
costs in economic terms. That is, are consumers and producers likely to be better off as a result 
of the plan? Answering these three questions is not always straightforward because of problems 
with defining markets and estimating benefits and costs. The answers often depend on the 
details of how an industry operates and the particulars of the alleged market failures, as we 
illustrate with our examples. 
We find that different ratings industries share some common features. For example, 
most ratings firms operate in highly concentrated markets. At the same time, for those 
industries we examine in detail, we do not find evidence of substantial market power. Our 
analysis of different ratings firms suggests that market forces generally provide consumers and 
                                                 
5  For a seminal treatment of market failure, see Francis M. Bator The Anatomy of Market Failure. 72 Q. J. ECON. 
351, 351-379 (1958). 
6  Consider, for example, illicit drug laws in the United States. While policymakers and reformers agree that the 
illegal drug trade in the U.S. needs to be controlled, drug laws have largely failed due to the lack of any viable 
regulatory solutions. The war on drugs is steadily weakening for many reasons, some of which include the 
inability to police covert dealings on private property and the lucrative incentives that overpower risks of 
incarceration (and enable bribes). In response to the failure in drug regulation, Kurt L. Schmoke, former Mayor 
of the City of Baltimore has observed, “It has been said that in public policy development we must distinguish 
between ideas that sound good and good ideas that are sound.” See Kurt L. Schmoke, (reviewing J. JIM GRAY, 
WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT (2001)), available at 
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producers with useful ratings. In most cases, such markets do not require government 
intervention. Indeed, very little government regulation is seen across the majority of ratings 
firms we consider. Market forces work to ensure that the benefits of the rating service are worth 
the expense; moreover, market forces are capable of keeping pace with technological shifts. In 
contrast, the benefits of government regulation are likely to fall short of the costs in many 
instances, and the government is not particularly adept at keeping up with industries 
characterized by rapid technological change. 
We begin by considering two case studies that have caught the attention of policy 
makers. In particular, Section II evaluates the need for regulating media ratings firms and 
Section III examines the need for regulating the credit ratings industry.
7 The detailed analysis 
highlights two factors relevant in a review of the possible benefits of regulation—namely the 
presence of a significant market failure and the ability of government to correct for that failure 
in a cost effective way. In Section IV, we then examine other industries in which ratings firms 
play a role. This review enables us to identify some key features that affect the structure of 
different ratings industries, and also allows us to assess conditions where regulation, or some 
other policy intervention, might improve industry performance.  Section V summarizes our 
main conclusions and identifies areas for future research.  
II.  REGULATING MEDIA RATINGS: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
Media ratings have received quite a bit of press over the last few years. At the center of 
the controversy is Nielsen Media Research, the primary company providing ratings for 
television shows in the United States. The controversy initially began in 2002 when Nielsen 
announced it was switching from a paper-based method to an electronic technology for 
measuring demographics in local television ratings for Boston, but came to a fevered pitch in 
2004 as other large cities were added to the list.
8  
                                                 
7  We use the term “ratings industry” to indicate the group of firms that provide ratings of a particular type. While 
not an “industry” in the usual sense of the word, this phrase allows us to distinguish the market structure of the 
ratings firms as separate from the products and services they rate. 
8  The old paper diary method of capturing who was watching programs in local markets would be gradually 
replaced by an electronic method called the People Meter in major markets. See discussion infra Section II.A.1. 
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Several powerful industries have a keen interest in television ratings because ratings can 
have a dramatic impact on a firm’s bottom line. Ratings are the “currency” used for 
advertising-supported television––they form the basis for negotiating the price of advertising 
time.
9 Advertising provides practically all revenue for broadcast television and is a large and 
increasing revenue source for cable television.
10 Advertising companies and the agencies that 
create their ads use ratings to focus advertising campaigns on target audiences with different 
demographic characteristics, such as women between the ages of 18 and 34. Broadcasters and 
cable companies use these ratings to decide which shows stay on the air, which new shows are 
developed, and which audiences they wish to target.
11 Ratings are also used by policymakers in 
defining markets for antitrust and regulatory purposes, and in helping to define such concepts 
as the hours covered by broadcasting indecency rules.
12  
Because media ratings affect the profitability of many different companies, it is not 
surprising that a proposed change in ratings measurement technology was controversial. Critics 
of Nielsen’s change in measurement techniques initially claimed that the sampling method used 
                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.medialifemagazine.com/news2002/feb02/feb04/4_thurs/news2thursday.html; Nielsen Media 
Research, Nielsen Releases Local Demographic Ratings for Summer Cable Shows, News Release, Aug. 4, 2005, 
available at http://www.nielsenmedia.com/newsreleases/2005/cable_demo_release_july05.doc.  
9  Such ratings have also been used by public television, which are included in all ratings measures. For instance, a 
PBS affiliate has used ratings data to test the effectiveness of its telethons. See KCTS Public Network, Viewer 
FAQ, (2005), at http://www.kcts.org/inside/contact/faq/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2005). 
10 See Molly Peterson, Cable Industry Warned: High Rates May Draw Regulation. CongressDaily. Mar. 25, 2004 
at Technology Daily PM; David Haffenreffer & Deborah Marchini, Advertising & The Economy. CNN: MONEY 
MORNING, May 14, 2002. See also Meredith Corporation’s fiscal year 2005 unaudited financial statement, 
where it reports that 97.89% of total broadcasting revenue came from non-political and political advertising. 
Meredith Corporation, SEC 10-K Report, (Sept. 12, 2005) at 23, available at  http://yahoo.brand.edgar-
online.com/doctrans/finSys_main.asp?formfilename=0000065011-05-000130&nad (last visited Sept. 28, 2005). 
According to Viacom, owner of CBS, the majority of TV network revenues are generated from advertising sales 
and television licensing sales. See Viacom, SEC 10-K  Report, (Mar. 16, 2005) at II-3, available at 
http://www.viacom.com/pdf/form10KMar2005.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2005). 
11 Frequently, shows are taken off the air that do not enjoy good ratings, even though they appeal to certain 
audiences. As Nielsen explains on its website, “The irony of the mass medium of television is that a program 
with ‘only’ a few million viewers may be an unpopular program. It may take ten million viewers for a network 
or nationally syndicated program to be popular enough to be a business success.” See Nielsen Media Research, 
Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.nielsenmedia.com/FAQ/ratings.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2005).  
For more on how networks employ ratings, see Ronald Goettler, Advertising Rates, Audience Composition, and 
Competition in the Network Television Industry (1999) (Working Paper #199-E28 in Carnegie Mellon 
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with the new technology discriminated against minorities, undercounting African American 
and Hispanic viewers.
13 It was alleged that this undercounting reduced minority programming 
and minority employment in the media industry.
14 The basis for that charge, however, has been 
hotly disputed.
15 In fact, several minority-oriented networks, including Black Entertainment 
Television and the Spanish language broadcaster Univision, came out in support of local People 
Meters, the electronic technology slated for use in major market local ratings measurement.
16 
The racial bias claims have since faded.
17 
The other line of complaints has targeted Nielsen’s dominant position in the industry. 
As such, critics suggest that the company is unresponsive to its clients and is trying to push 
poorly developed technology and faulty sampling methods.
18 Such criticisms are not unique to 
media ratings: local cable and phone service companies have received similar accusations.
19 If 
                                                                                                                                                           
12 See James G. Webster, The Role of Audience Ratings in Communications Policy, 59 FED. COMM. & L. 263 
(1991). See also, David M. Hunsaker, Duopoly Wars: Analysis and Case Studies of the FCC’s Radio Contour 
Overlap Rules, 2 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS, 21, 21-42 (1994). 
13 The most vociferous critic has been Rupert Murdoch and News Corporation. See Raymond Hernandez  & Stuart 
Elliott, The Odd Couple vs. Nielsen, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2004. 
14 In particular, critics claimed that people meter “fault rates”––the percentage of the sample containing unusable 
data, frequently due to equipment problems––were higher for African Americans and Hispanics than for other 
groups because of racial bias in the implementation of the system. Meg James, Nielsen Meters Dealt a Setback; 
A TV trade group declines to endorse the rollout in New York of the viewership gauge, LA TIMES. May 28, 
2004, at C3. Hearings, sponsored by Montana Senator Conrad Burns, were held in the summer of 2004 to 
investigate these charges. 
15 Nielsen presented statistical explanations for the higher fault rates. Susan D. Whiting, Reply to questions from 
Senator Conrad Burns (Oct. 20, 2004).  
16 James, supra note 14. Betsy Streisand. The tracker behind the tube. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. Aug. 11, 2004. 
David Poltrack, vice president of research at CBS, admitted in April 2004: “We think Nielsen’s minority 
sampling in New York [a key area of contention] is actually very good.” Brooks Barnes, News Corp. Opposes 
New Local-TV Rating System. WALL ST. J., April 5, 2004, at B3.  
17 See, for instance, How Nielsen Stood Up to Murdoch: Fox played the race card to upend a new TV ratings 
system. It didn’t work,” BUS. WEEK., Sept. 20, 2004. 
18 See, e.g., the comments of Pat Mullen, CEO of Tribune Company’s Tribune Broadcasting, as quoted in a 
National Post article: “[the people meter] continues to be embarrassingly defective… And because Nielsen is a 
monopoly, we have nowhere else to turn.” Neil Roland, Minorities back Nielsen’s attack on ratings bill,” 
NAT’L. POST, July 28, 2005.  
19  See  Thomas W. Hazlett, Cable TV Reregulation: The Episodes You Didn’t See on C-SPAN, 16 CATO 
REGULATION  (1993),  available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg16n2d.html (last visited Sept. 28, 
2005); See also, Karen Jacobs, Technology Journal: Not at Your Service –– Competition Was Supposed to Make 
Telecom Companies in the U.S. More Attentive to the Customer; What Happened?, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 
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the claims regarding television ratings are true, it would be reasonable to consider regulating 
Nielsen in some fashion to curb its abuse of market power. 
The most specific regulatory proposal to emerge from the debate over television ratings 
is a bill introduced in the Senate in 2005 that would require media ratings companies to obtain 
accreditation from an internal industry oversight council before any new ratings service could 
be sold.
20 While the specific Senate proposal may not become law, it serves to frame the 
analysis of whether it is desirable to regulate media ratings companies. 
None of the debate surrounding the use of electronic People Meters for local television 
ratings has directly addressed the three regulatory questions we raised in the introduction. 
Those calling for media ratings regulation usually focus on market structure, rather than market 
failure. Critics assert that Nielsen is a monopoly. They claim it makes unilateral decisions 
without the checks and balances of competition; decisions that are ill thought out and will hurt 
the media industry as a whole.
21 Once the specter of monopoly is invoked, regulation emerges 
as a natural candidate for limiting the power of the firm. The government’s track record in 
restoring balance in monopolistic markets is debatable, of course, which may be why proposals 
thus far have called for an internal industry group to oversee and sanction media ratings 
measurement.
22  
The third question, on costs and benefits of regulation, has been largely ignored in the 
media ratings debate. But without a sense of whether the benefits are likely to outweigh the 
costs, a decision to regulate could be counterproductive.  
                                                 
20 Senate hearings were held to discuss this proposal on July 27, 2005. The bill, supported by News Corp. and 
introduced by Senator Conrad Burns, is titled the Fairness, Accuracy, Inclusivity, and Responsiveness in 
Ratings Act of 2005. See Tory Newmyer, Regulatory Bill Would Benefit News Corp., ROLL CALL, July 13, 
2005. The council charged with mandatory oversight is the very council that was itself created in the aftermath 
of House hearings regarding media ratings held in the mid 1960s. Fairness, Accuracy, Inclusivity, and 
Responsiveness in Ratings Act of 2005, S. 1372. 109
th Cong. (July 1, 2005), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:S.+1372 (last visited Nov. 29, 2005). 
21 Stuart Elliot, Remember how upset Univision was over Nielsen’s people meters? Now, both sides have dropped 
legal actions and will seek a deal on counting viewers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004, at 14.   
22 See e.g., Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing 
the Evidence, 17 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 3, 3-26 (2003); Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, 17 





   
 
7
A.  The Market Failure Issue  
Before we can answer the question of whether there is a market failure, we need a 
working knowledge of the technology and the market. We begin by providing an overview of 
how media rating methods have evolved over time. We then consider market structure and end 
the section by weighing the evidence on whether a significant market failure really exists. 
1.  How Ratings Are Measured 
The earliest attempts at media ratings relied on telephone interviews. Starting in 1929, 
Archibald Crossley, on behalf of the Association of National Advertisers, randomly selected 
people to interview by phone.
23 The method relied strictly on recall, what people could 
remember about listening to radio programs and sponsors the day before the call was made. In 
1935, C.E. Hooper modified that method by surveying people as they listened to the radio, the 
so-called “telephone coincidental” method.
24 This eliminated the faulty memory problems 
associated with recall methods. On the other hand, this method was limited to rating shows 
airing during reasonable calling hours. Late night and early morning programs received no 
ratings at all.  
In 1936 A.C. Nielsen introduced the first electronic measurement device. The company 
entered the radio ratings industry with an “audiometer,” a box hooked directly to a radio that 
measured minute-by-minute when a radio was on and the channel that was broadcasting.
25 The 
company recruited people in advance to participate in the ratings process. The audiometer 
method had a number of obvious advantages over previous methods. In particular, the ratings 
were based on actual behavior as opposed to potentially flawed recollections. The meters also 
provided much more data. They could measure when the radio was on at any time. The small 
                                                 
23 See American Social History Project/Center for Media & Learning, City U. of N.Y., & the Center for History 
and New Media, GMU, History Matters: The Rating Game: Broadcasters Rely on Poll Numbers They Don’t 
Trust, at http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6266.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2005).  
24 Id.  Telephone coincidentals are still used today to test the accuracy of other data collection methods. See 
Nielsen Media Research, What TV Ratings Really Mean, at http://www.nielsenmedia.com/whatratingsmean/ 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2005).  
25 See Nielsen Media Research, Company History, at http://www.nielsenmedia.com/history.html (last visited Sept. 
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time increments captured changes in stations, which is especially important for determining 
whether people switch when a station break or commercial airs.  
Electronic meters do have weaknesses though. First, installing meters was far more 
expensive than making a few phone calls. Unlike telephone interviews, the equipment could 
fail, plus the passive meter could only detect when the set was on, not how many people were 
listening to it. People were sometimes reluctant to accept a black box in their homes. For those 
that did participate, it was unclear whether the presence of the audiometer altered typical 
listening behavior.
26 In general, the advantages of electronic measurement were (and are still) 
viewed as outweighing the disadvantages.
27 Thus, when television began to eclipse radio in the 
1950s, Nielsen adapted the audiometer to the new medium.  
Despite its usefulness, electronic measurement has generally been supplemented by 
simpler (and cheaper) measurement techniques. Because of the expense of attaching electronic 
meters to numerous television sets in multiple states, and the need to provide both local and 
national ratings, Nielsen implemented paper diaries as a supplement to meters. As with 
electronic meters, people have to be recruited in advance to participate in television or radio 
ratings that use diaries.
28 Those agreeing to participate receive a special journal and are asked 
to record all of the programs they see or hear over a seven-day period, all in 15-minute 
increments. Because it costs little to implement, large samples are relatively easy to compile 
with this method. Diaries can therefore be effective in reaching a broad cross-section of 
households. Respondents need not even have a telephone. Diaries can also enable media rating 
companies to ask for extra information, such as the number and ages of the people in the 
audience, their attentiveness to commercials, and the like.  
The diary method, like all of the methods discussed so far, has its shortcomings as well. 
Filling out a diary can be tedious and time-consuming, so many people refuse to participate. 
High non-participation rates can lead to a biased sample, where those responding are inherently 
                                                 
26 This last issue is referred to as the Hawthorne Effect: knowing they are being “watched,” people act differently. 
See F. ROETHLISBERGER & W. DICKINSON, MANAGEMENT & THE WORKER: AN ACCOUNT OF A RESEARCH 
PROGRAM CONDUCTED BY THE WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY, CHICAGO (1939).  
27 See American Social History Project/Center for Media & Learning, City U. of N.Y., & the Center for History 
and New Media, GMU, supra note 23. 
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different from those not responding. When bias is acute, it can call into question the validity of 
the resulting ratings.
29 Some people also tend to wait until the last moment to fill out their 
diaries, meaning the problems with recall are at play here just as with the telephone interviews 
of the 1930s.
30 Faulty recall can result in diary keepers over-reporting more familiar or more 
frequently viewed channels. Thus, more frequently viewed channels may get higher ratings 
than they deserve for particular shows, while special interest cable channels may get lower 
ratings than they deserve.
31 A final problem is that many diaries are unusable––some never get 
mailed in or are filled out incorrectly.
32 
The combination of paper diaries with electronic meters has been the standard approach 
for national ratings measurement for several decades, although meter technology has continued 
to evolve and sampling procedures have changed over time. Nielsen’s electronic People Meter 
became the standard for collecting national television ratings data in the late 1980s. The People 
Meter is a box about the size of a paperback book and is placed on or near each television set in 
the 5,000 to 10,000 households that typically comprise the national sample.
33 The box 
automatically records the channel directly from television shows and commercials to identify 
what is playing. In order to link that information to who is watching, the People Meter includes 
a remote control device. Each member of a household is assigned a button, which they push 
when they begin watching and again when they are done watching. Collecting data in this 
manner can lead to another potential problem, though––“button pushing fatigue.”
34 Some 
                                                 
29 Non-response bias is an issue for all survey methods, including telephone surveys and People Meters. The more 
effort a survey requires from a participant, the more likely non-response bias is an issue. 
30 See American Social History Project/Center for Media & Learning, City U. of N.Y., & the Center for History 
and New Media, GMU, supra  note 23. See also, Museum of Broadcast Communications, Ratings, at 
http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/R/htmlR/ratings/ratings.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2005). 
31  See  Erwin Ephron, The Arbitron PPM Versus the Nielsen Meter/Diary, Oct. 2003, at 
http://www.ephrononmedia.com/article_archive/articleViewerPublic.asp?articleID=107 (last visited Sept. 28, 
2005). 
32 One source notes that as many as 50% are generally discarded due to unusable data. See Museum of Broadcast 
Communications, Ratings, at http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/R/htmlR/ratings/ratings.htm (last visited Sept. 
28, 2005). 
33 See Nielsen Media Research, supra note 23. Participants remain in the sample for approximately 2 years, but at 
any given point there are new households added as others drop out. 
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industry observers have speculated that panel members might tire of recording their presence 
and either skip button pushing or lower their television viewing altogether.
35 
Getting accurate media ratings is a challenge regardless of the technology employed. 
Even with a combination of paper and electronic measurement techniques, obtaining a full 
census of the entire nation’s media consumption is generally not feasible. Instead, a sample of 
the full population must be taken. Measuring the audience accurately and getting a 
representative sample requires considerable effort for all of the companies working in this field.  
Sampling is a complicated statistical issue. The main issue of importance for this debate 
is population coverage. Media ratings companies spend substantial resources trying to make 
their samples as representative as possible, taking into account such factors as family size, sex 
and age of household head, income, and education. As the number of cable and satellite 
channels continues to grow, and as advertising companies continue to target their products to 
narrower groups, the costs of getting a representative sample can be expected to increase.
36 
Sample size typically needs to increase to allow for data analysis at a more detailed level, so 
that valid statements can be made about the viewing habits of different groups, such as 
Hispanic young women or Asian teenagers.
37 The companies conducting media measurements 
have continued to improve the technologies employed over time, but perfection is not attainable 
at a reasonable cost. A rating firm therefore must strike a balance between sample size, 
reliability and the cost of obtaining the data.
38  
                                                 
35 Id.  
36 See John Dimling, Measuring Future Electronic Media Audiences, 25, RC-4, J.  ADVERTISING RES. (1985). 
37 The latter approach is referred to as “over-sampling” See e.g. National Center for Health Statistics, available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/datawh/nchsdefs/oversample.htm (page last reviewed Dec. 16, 2004).  
38 For example, most presidential polls have relatively small samples, contacting 1,000 to 1,500 registered voters. 
The typical sampling error for these studies is around +/- 4%. Most consumer products market research, on the 
other hand, are considerably larger and therefore attain higher accuracy levels. For example, a poll conducted by 
the National Retail Foundation had a sample size of almost 7,000 with a sampling error of +/- 1%. For 
presidential polls, see  Kerry holds edge over Bush following first debate.  USA  TODAY. (May 20, 2005), 
available at  http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/nation/polls/2004-09-30-debate-poll.htm  (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2005); Washington Wrap, CBS  NEWS, (Feb. 11, 2004), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/02/12/politics/main599897.shtml (last visited Sept. 28, 2005). For retail 
poll, see National Retail Foundation. Back to School Spending to Slide Eight Percent as Demand for Computers 
Cools.  (July 19, 2005), at 
http://www.nrf.com/content/default.asp?folder=press/release2005&file=bts0705.htm&bhcp=1_ (last visited 
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New technology can address some of the problems with sampling, but is likely to 
replace those problems with others. For instance, it will soon be technically feasible to collect 
detailed data on programs that are watched using cable boxes and satellite hook-ups.
39 This 
kind of measurement is both pervasive and passive, meaning that sampling bias and participant 
fatigue would be of less concern.
40 These methods do have drawbacks though, some of which 
are familiar. Like the radio audiometers of the past, cable and satellite techniques would be 
capable of recording in minute detail the station that is on, but would not be able to record 
exactly who is watching. The TV playing in the background with no one in the room, a family 
show viewed by all members of a household, and a Super Bowl party for 20 would each be 
recorded the same way. Thus the data collected could not be segmented according to 
advertisers’ target groups. Just collecting overall household data poses problems because 
linking what is watched to the delivery of the program, without any explicit consent on the part 
of viewers, raises some thorny privacy issues. If privacy is protected, on the other hand, it 
either means compromising on audience reach––bringing us back to sampling problems––or 
compromising on the information about who is watching––say by aggregating the data.
41 
Given the concerns over the level of effort required from individual participants in 
television ratings, another branch of ratings measurement research has focused on increasing 
participation rates through more passive methods of tracking viewership. One such effort is the 
portable people meter (PPM) being developed and tested by Arbitron.
42 The PPM is a small 
device that individuals would carry each day, much as they do a cell phone or a pager. The 
device collects identifying signals encoded in each television show and radio program the 
individual watches, listens to, or is otherwise exposed to due to proximity to a television or 
radio signal––whether in the home or out. The PPM is not entirely passive––individuals must 
                                                 
39  See  Bill Harvey, Better Television Audience Measurement Through Cable and Satellite Set Top Boxes,  at 
http://www.billharveyconsulting.com/articles/pdf/BetterTelevisionAudienceMeasurement.pdf (last visited Sept. 
28, 2005). See also, Jon Gertner, Our Ratings, Ourselves: The Mismeasurement of TV, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 
2005, available at http://medialit.med.sc.edu/our_ratings_ourselves.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2005).  
40 Sample bias would still need to be monitored, since not every household has cable or satellite. 
41 For households with DVR services, such as TiVo or Replay TV, satellite and cable measures could overstate 
viewership since not all programs recorded by the system will necessarily be watched. 
42 Arbitron, Portable People Meter, at http://www.arbitron.com/portable_people_meters/home.htm (last visited 
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clip it on each day and put it in a docking station each night for the data to be uploaded to the 
rating firm––but the level of effort required by panelists is lower than that required for other 
collection methods. In the future, the devices might even be programmed to capture print media 
reading habits and the retail stores visited by participants.
43 Eventually, all media viewing, ad 
exposure, and purchasing behavior could be studied together using one data source.  
This last point––the ability to link media exposure, ad exposure, and purchasing 
behavior––gets to the heart of media ratings. In the past, advertisers and their agencies were 
satisfied with program ratings. Chances were if someone watched a show he at least heard the 
commercials, justifying an advertiser’s expenditures on airtime. As a result, a program’s 
demographics were thought to cover the demographics for commercial viewership as well. 
Today, advertisers place far less faith in that kind of spillover.
44 Technologies like the DVR 
services TiVo and Replay TV enable viewers to “time shift” their viewing, and thus to fast 
forward through programs and skip ads altogether.
45 The Yankee Group, a communications 
research firm, predicts that the number of homes with DVR will increase nearly 5-fold in the 
next few years, from 7 million in 2004 to 33.5 million by 2008.
46  In this environment, 
advertisers can no longer infer ad exposure from program measurements, although perhaps they 
never could.
47 While time shifting technologies are relatively new, they revive an old interest in 
a difficult issue: how to best measure the effectiveness of advertising.
48 
Even if an ideal method for measuring ratings and ad exposure were developed, a 
serious question would remain as to how those ratings were actually used. As one industry 
observer notes, “the weakest link in the system, at present, seems to be how the ratings are 
used. Networks tout rating superiorities that show 0.1 percent differences, differences that 
                                                 
43 Arbitron, Informational Webcast titled Audience Measurement In A Portable People Meter World, July 11, 
2003. 
44 Jane Black, Coming Soon: A Horror Show for TV Ads, BUS. WEEK, June 27, 2003. 
45 Lyra Research, Survey Finds DVR Users Tuning into Live TV Programs Late to Skip Ads and Save Time, May 
27, 2004, available at 
http://www.lyra.com/PressRoom.nsf/0/19e95b719e3e964a85256ea6004c5d8c?OpenDocument. 
46  See Ann Oldenburg, TiVo’s ripple effect: Water-cooler chill, USA TODAY, Mar. 23, 2005, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/life/television/news/2005-03-23-tivo-office-chat_x.htm. 
47 Even as early as 1971, movies such as Disney’s The Barefoot Executive were making jokes about television 
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certainly are not statistically significant.”
49 This problem underscores the tension between two 
key ratings users: broadcasters and advertisers. Media providers may need accurate data for 
program planning, but their primary concern is maximizing the price of ad time. Advertisers, 
on the other hand, want to select the most effective media vehicle for the message at hand, and 
limit their costs.  
In addition to misusing the statistics, for methods with a predetermined collection time, 
like paper diaries, the statistics themselves can be manipulated. Most people have heard of 
television “sweeps” periods––the weeks designated for measuring television ratings where 
diary keepers record and report their viewing––because broadcasters hype them so much in 
advance.
50 The networks and cable companies offer special programming during the weeks that 
ratings panelists are filling out their diaries. As a consequence, those ratings are not 
representative of typical viewing habits in non-sweeps months.  
This review of ratings methodology reveals that all of the ratings methods have their 
strengths and weaknesses. More to the point for our analysis, different methods can result in 
different ratings. The claims of abuse of market power raised in the controversy over the move 
to local People Meters become easier to understand in this context. If, as mentioned above, 
paper diaries tend to inflate the ratings for popular programs and networks, we might expect the 
heads of those programs and networks to resist changes that replace the diaries with other 
technologies.
51  
The overview of ratings methods also hints at a feature of the industry that is important 
for assessing whether regulation might be needed: what services compete in the relevant market 
and how is that market structured? We next turn to these questions. 
                                                                                                                                                           
48 Stefanie Olsen, Advertisers face up to TiVo reality, CNET News, Apr. 26, 2004. 
49 See The Museum of Broadcasting Communications, supra note 32. 
50 Jon Gertner, Our Ratings, Ourselves: The Mismeasurement of TV, N.Y. TIMES, (Apr. 10, 2005), available at 
http://medialit.med.sc.edu/our_ratings_ourselves.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2005). 
51 See the discussion infra section II. Note that proponents of the portable people meter recognize that switching to 
the new technology will involve an equally painful transition. See P.A. Pellegrini, Listen without Prejudice, 
VUE (June 2005). (“The transition from diary to meter measurements for TV audiences led to differences in 
results between the two methods …which required a period of adjustment through the disruption in the trading 
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2.  The Market for Television Ratings 
Nielsen is, at present, the sole provider of television ratings in the United States. In 
many instances, however, a monopoly does not necessarily translate into meaningful market 
power.
52 To better understand the structure of the market and the extent of any market power, 
we need to consider three key issues: barriers to entry, potential market entrants, and product 
substitutes.
53 For potential entry, we ask whether other firms could provide television ratings if 
it were profitable to do so. In particular, we explore whether radio ratings companies, other 
media ratings firms, or even marketing research firms could provide television ratings. If so, 
these “supply-side” pressures could attenuate any power Nielsen might have from its monopoly 
in television ratings. Moreover, such firms may be able to enter the market quickly if there are 
relatively low barriers to entry. For product, or “demand-side,” substitution, we explore the 
options that broadcasters and advertisers have in lieu of using Nielsen’s television ratings. As 
with supply side pressure, product substitutes tend to weaken a monopolist’s ability to take 
unilateral actions. We find that even if Nielsen currently has a monopoly in the provision of 
television ratings, its continued dominance is not assured and there appear to be limits on its 
ability to exercise market power. 
a.  Competition in U.S. Media Ratings Over Time  
As already noted, the history of television and radio ratings is intertwined. Media 
ratings began with radio in the early 1930s, but most of the radio ratings firms added television 
                                                                                                                                                           
measurement panels were superior to diary methods. …The next transition for TV, from button-pushing meters 
to passive measurement using PPM, has also required some adjustment.” p. 2-3). 
52 A trivial example would be the Wendy’s “monopoly” of the Frosty. A monopoly in a narrow sense might exist, 
but there could be close substitutes (chocolate shakes from McDonalds, milkshakes from Baskin Robbins). As 
the example illustrates, the definition of monopoly and the determination of market power hinge on the 
definition of the “market.” Defining a market in economic terms requires empirical analysis and data of this sort 
is unavailable for media ratings. Regardless of the technical market definition, however, another constraint on 
“monopoly” power is competition for a market rather than in a market, such as many authors have noted exists 
for network products like computers and software. For a discussion of competition for the market, see David S. 
Evans & Richard Schmalensee, Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically Competitive 
Industries, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, VOL 2 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern ed., 
MIT Press 2002). 
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ratings to their offerings when that technology came along.
54 In fact, Arbitron, one of the early 
media raters, provided television ratings in direct competition with Nielsen Media Research 
until 1993.
55 The barriers to entry involved in moving between radio and television ratings 
measurement do not appear to be significant.
56 Many of the fundamentals of measuring an 
audience, be it for television or radio, are the same. Indeed, as noted earlier, audience 
measurement technology research is currently focused on developing a portable people meter 
that would capture consumption for both television and radio programs.
57 The history of media 
ratings suggests that the barriers to entry for television ratings are not substantial for companies 
operating in the broader media ratings market, although that market may not be able to support 
multiple raters, or end users may prefer a single supplier––points we explore in more detail 
below. Nonetheless, a ready group of potential competitors to Nielsen appears to exist.
58  
                                                 
54 C.E. Hooper and Arbitron, which began offering a radio ratings service in 1949, both provided television 
ratings. Arbitron provided TV ratings until 1993, but Hooper sold out to Nielsen shortly after television became 
popular.  See American Social History Project/Center for Media & Learning, City U. of N.Y., & the Center for 
History and New Media, GMU, supra note 23; The Museum of Broadcasting Communications, supra note 30; 
Richard M. Rockwood, Arbitron Research Report.  (Feb. 2002), available at 
http://www.focusinvestor.com/ArbitronResearchReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2005). 
55 Arbitron entered the media ratings industry in 1949 with a TV ratings service. It expanded to radio ratings in 
1965, where it remained until 1993, when it stopped providing television ratings and focused its efforts on radio.  
See Richard M. Rockwood, Arbitron Research Report.  (Feb. 2002), available at 
http://www.focusinvestor.com/ArbitronResearchReport.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2005). According to the 
company, Arbitron exited television ratings “because measuring audience sizes for local TV stations isn't 
profitable.” Josef Adalian, Inside Boston TV Arbitron’s bow worth big bucks to Channel 25. BOSTON HERALD, 
Dec. 13, 1993. The publicly given reason suggests either that the television market may not be large enough to 
support more than one ratings provider or that ratings users prefer a single source. 
56 Certainly, radio listening and television viewing are different along several dimensions. For instance, a good 
deal of radio consumption today (around 46%) occurs in automobiles or on portable devices, not in homes. 
(Radio Advertising Bureau. Radio Marketing Guide & Fact Book for Advertisers, 12 (2003-2004), available at 
http://www.rab.com/station/marketing_guide/RMGFB2004.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2005).) For television, out-
of-home viewing is only 10-20%. (Gertner, supra note 50.) Less is known about out-of-home television 
viewing, however. According to one industry observer, “We’re beginning to learn that out-of-home television 
viewing is more than just men in bars, watching sporting events in the evening.” See Arbitron, The Portable 
People Meter, at http://www.arbitron.com/portable_people_meters/home.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2005). 
57 For more on the development of this technology, see Arbitron, The Portable People Meter,  at 
http://www.arbitron.com/portable_people_meters/home.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2005).  
58 According to the Census Bureau, more than 100 establishments compete in overall media ratings. U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2002 Economic Census, Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services, 1, 17 (Oct. 2004), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/ec02/ec0254i09.pdf. Companies include Arbitron, BPA WorldWide, and 
MediaMark, in addition to Nielsen Media Research. Arbitron, About Arbitron,  at 
http://www.arbitron.com/about/home.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2005); BPA Worldwide, at 
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Arbitron is an especially attractive candidate in this regard. If the company is successful 
in developing a portable people meter capable of measuring ad exposure in multiple media 
formats along with subsequent retail visits, Arbitron would be able to address the most 
important issue among media buyers: ad effectiveness. This could translate to an industry shift, 
with Nielsen’s television ratings service displaced and Arbitron emerging as the dominant 
media rater, not just television rater.
59 
Potential entrants may come from an even broader market than media ratings. A.C. 
Nielsen was not a brand new firm when it began collecting radio data in the mid 1930s. The 
company had started operations in 1923 as a marketing research firm.
60 Including marketing 
research companies in our collection of potential competitors would expand the list 
considerably.
61 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there were 5,359 establishments offering 
market research services in the United States in 2002 (the most recent year available), 
generating more than $12 billion in receipts.
62 These companies are the firms that conduct the 
surveys we receive in the mail, by phone, by e-mail, and occasionally even when we walk 
down the street. Clearly, many of these marketing research skills are transferable to the 
specialized task of media research. Thus, market research firms could be viewed as potential 
competitors in television ratings, if not actual ones.  
                                                                                                                                                           
(last visited Sept. 28, 2005); and VNU (Nielsen’s parent company), About VNU,  at 
http://www.vnu.com/about/subsidiaries/n.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2005). 
59 We suggest here the scenario of Arbitron supplanting Nielsen as the dominant firm, rather than Arbitron re-
entering competition with Nielsen because we find that media ratings, like so many other kinds of ratings 
businesses tend toward concentrated markets. See infra Section IV.A. However, note that in 2000 Nielsen and 
Arbitron entered an agreement whereby Arbitron gave Nielsen the option to join Arbitron in a future 
deployment of the PPM.system; Nielsen is currently evaluating whether to continue with the PPM project. See 
Ceridian, Arbitron and Nielsen Media Research Sign Agreement to Evaluate New Audience Ratings Technology, 
June 1, 2000, available at  http://www.ceridian.com/corp/article/0,2868,10965-52649,00.html.  See also, Joe 
Mandese, Nielsen Accelerates Portable People Meter Effort, May Decide Soon, MEDIA DAILY NEWS, Nov. 15, 
2005,  available at 
http://publications.mediapost.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=Articles.showArticleHomePage&art_aid=36322. 
60  See A.C. Nielsen, Our History,  at  http://www2.acnielsen.com/company/history.shtml (last visited Sept. 28, 
2005).  
61 Market research is a large, unconcentrated market. The four largest firms account for less than 21 percent of 
industry revenue. The fifty largest firms account for only 55 percent of revenue and less than 10 percent of 
establishments. The average establishment size is around 25 employees with slightly more than $2 million in 
revenue. U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 Economic Census, Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services, 1, 1-5 
(Oct. 2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ec02/ec0254i09.pdf. 
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Finally, satellite and cable companies may enter the media ratings business. As noted 
earlier, these companies are currently researching the potential for turning content delivery 
mechanisms––cable boxes and satellite dishes––into viewing data collection devices. While the 
trickier aspects of this proposition are legal and ethical, not technological, the potential exists 
for satellite and cable providers to develop substitutes to Nielsen’s television ratings, at least 
for sizable segments of the market. 
Potential competitors can exert very real pressure on a dominant firm.
63 The history of 
media measurement reinforces this point. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Nielsen faced a 
series of challengers in television ratings––each claiming improved technology and better 
service than Nielsen. R.D. Percy, Arbitron, Audits of Great Britain, and SRI’s System for 
Measuring and Reporting Television (SMART) each contested Nielsen’s television rating 
service.
64  The pressure applied by these rivals appears to have contributed to technological 
upgrades in audience measurement, including today’s People Meter.
65 The challengers failed 
not because of insurmountable barriers to entry or legal hurdles. Instead, failure appears to have 
resulted from a lack of understanding of the market, a lack of financial commitment required to 
firmly establish a television rating service, or simply an untenable business model.
66 Nielsen 
had to overcome similar obstacles in its years of operation. Factors of this sort typically do not 
rise to the level of significant barriers to entry. 
In addition to the limits that potential competitors place on Nielsen’s market power, we 
should also consider the opportunities for product substitution. Specifically we examine other 
options that broadcasters, cable companies, and advertising agencies may have to obtain 
ratings. First, large firms could generate some of their own information. The larger 
broadcasting and cable firms all have in-house research departments. Both CBS and NBC have 
                                                 
63 KATZ & ROSEN, supra note 53 at 529. WILLIAM BAUMOL, JOHN PANZAR, & ROBERT WILLIG, CONTESTABLE 
MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982). 
64 Joe Mandese, They Didn’t Get SMART: The television industry looks to digital measurement, 21 AM. 
DEMOGRAPHICS 33 (Aug. 1999). 
65 SMART Show is Canceled, Multichannel News, May 31, 1999; Mandese, supra note 64.   
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large research facilities in Las Vegas.
67 These research departments typically track show 
popularity for planning and estimating advertising revenues. Internal researchers conduct focus 
groups and send out questionnaires. These activities currently supplement Nielsen’s ratings, but 
could be expanded if the firms felt that Nielsen’s services were no longer accurate or too 
expensive. For example, when Nielsen reported that competition from cable and satellite 
programs caused daytime soap opera viewing to drop 18% among female viewers 18 to 34 
years of age, CBS investigated the findings.
68 
While it is highly unlikely that national advertisers would accept internal network 
measures as the sole method of pricing ads, it is possible for the large networks to pool their 
resources and form a separate non-profit ratings organization.
69 This option has been exercised 
in other countries.
70 Something similar has been tried in the U.S. as well. Unhappy with 
Nielsen’s broadcast measurements, ABC, CBS, NBC, and Fox commissioned the creation of 
SMART as a Nielsen competitor.
71 The networks later abandoned their support of SMART. 
Apparently, the cable companies felt that the new technology used by SMART was geared 
toward boosting network ratings at their expense. SMART therefore lacked enough support 
from key industry players for it to become the standard ratings service and the networks made 
little effort to win that support.
72 
Smaller networks and cable companies have other options as well. While they lack large 
internal research departments and deep pockets for bankrolling competing television rating 
                                                 
67  See Hubble Smith, NBC market research epicenter shifts to LV. REV.  J. (Oct. 30, 2003), available at 
http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2003/Oct-30-Thu-2003/business/22478388.html (last visited Sept. 28, 
2005). 
68 Bloomberg later reported that, “Nielsen’s numbers not only checked out, they underlined a new reality about 
U.S. daytime TV: Soap operas, once cash cows for the networks, are fading in popularity.” Bloomberg, U.S. 
Soap Operas Face Real Melodrama as TV Ratings, Ads Slip, (May 5, 2005), available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000087&sid=aqLu73fFCerc&refer=top_world_news# (last 
visited Sept. 28, 2005).  
69 Joint ventures might not be possible in the United States due to antitrust concerns. 
70 See discussion infra Section II.A.2.b. 
71 See Joe Terranova, Ratings Wars, 20 AM. DEMOGRAPHICS 31 (Oct. 1998); See also David Bauder, For TV's 
Nielsen ratings, problems with networks are a familiar story, AP, (Nov.14, 2003), available at 
http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/info/press/news/2003/111403_ap.pdf. 
72  See Steve McClellan, Turner says it won’t get SMART, 127 BROADCASTING & CABLE 62 (Mar. 1997); See also, 
Mandese, supra note 64. Arguably, had the networks been serious about displacing Nielsen, they could have 
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services, they also lack the pressure for ratings that national advertisers tend to place on the 
larger players. Smaller programmers are able to poll their viewers directly, and those with local 
business can rely on their detailed knowledge of the market.
73  
Reports that link TV viewing with consumer purchasing behavior are another important 
source of information. These reports are currently provided by media and market research 
firms, such as The Media Audit, The Media Center, IAG, and Simmons Market Research 
Bureau.
74 Indeed, several smaller stations have decided that these sources of information are 
sufficient, and have cancelled their contracts with Nielsen.
75  
This analysis suggests a wide variety of potential product substitutes, which can help to 
limit the potential of the dominant firm to exercise market power in the television ratings 
market. Losing small customers, knowing that larger customers can rely on internal research or 
can fund rivals, and knowing that all customers have access to consumer purchasing reports 
places pressure on Nielsen to be responsive to its clients. Fear of lost sales can be a powerful 
incentive to maintain quality.  
Our analysis of the television ratings market leads us to question whether Nielsen is in 
fact unresponsive to its customers’ needs. It is clearly the dominant firm now, but some clear 
alternatives loom on the horizon. Arbitron’s portable people meter and the cable and satellite 
companies’ data collection devices represent two possible substitutes for today’s technology. 
As economist Joseph Schumpeter has written:  
…in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, [what counts] is 
the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source 
of supply, the new type of organization…competition which commands a 
decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the 
                                                 
73  See Allison Romano, Nielsen Dumped, BROADCASTING  &  CABLE, (June 13, 2005), available at 
http://www.broadcastingandcable.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleID=CA607737.  See also, Brian 
Steinberg, A network's dream: TV viewers who recall commercials. WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2005), available at 
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05131/502690.stm.  
74 Romano, supra note 73. These firms conduct recall telephone interviews, along the lines of the first media 
ratings service provider, Crossley. 
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profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their 
very lives.
76  
Dramatic prose to be sure, but the core message of dynamic competition rings true in a 
number of segments of the economy.
77 These forces provide market discipline in media ratings 
as well, and cast doubt on the possibility that Nielsen could abuse its dominant position without 
consequence.  
b.  Media Ratings in Other Countries 
An examination of television ratings across the globe reveals similar market structures 
to that found in the United States. Media ratings tend to be heavily concentrated, often with a 
single firm providing television audience measurement. The one dissimilarity lies in who 
conducts the ratings. In many parts of the world ratings entities are not independent for-profit 
companies, but rather are supported by the media providers. For example, in the United 
Kingdom, the non-profit Broadcast Audience Research Board provides audience 
measurements. It was formed in 1981 when British broadcasters BBC and ITV joined forces to 
establish a ratings measurement entity. Currently, the Board is funded by five British 
broadcasters and is the only provider of audience measurements for all channels across all 
platforms in the UK, including terrestrial, satellite, and cable.
78 While the Board has its share of 
critics, the government has not intervened. Instead, disgruntled broadcasters have dropped their 
use of the Board’s service and turned to private market research companies like Swiss-based 
                                                 
76 JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 84 (3
rd ed. 1950). Schumpeter goes on to note 
that “It is hardly necessary to point out that competition of the kind we now have in mind acts not only when in 
being but also when it is merely an ever-present threat. It disciplines before it attacks.” (p. 85). These quotes are 
from the same chapter containing Schumpeter’s famous, and oft-quoted, line about the “perennial gale of 
creative destruction” (p. 84).  
77 For instance, phonograph albums were replaced by 8-track tapes, which were replaced by cassettes, which were 
replaced by CDs, which are in the process of being replaced by iPods. Computer hardware, with Moore’s Law, 
is another example. (See Webopedia, Moore’s Law, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/M/Moores_Law.html 
(last visited Dec. 8, 2005)). For a description of dynamic competition contrasted with traditional static 
competition, see Christian Ahlborn, David S. Evans, & Atilano Jorge Padilla, Competition Policy in the New 
Economy: Is European Competition Law Up to the Challenge?, 22 EUR. COMPETITION L.R.156, 160-161 
(2001).  
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GFK, which entered the UK market in 2003.
79 Another alternative is emerging from inside the 
industry. In 2006 the U.K. satellite television company Sky plans to introduce a new way to 
research its audience’s viewing habits by recording what 20,000 of its subscribers are 
watching.
80  
Comparable efforts led by industry can be seen outside of Europe as well. OzTAM in 
Australia, which is owned by the three major commercial networks, awarded a seven-year 
contract to one firm to be the sole provider of television ratings for national subscription 
services as well as for the five metropolitan area broadcasts.
81 A similar system operates in 
Russia, where broadcasters and other influential media owners have joined together to create 
the Media Committee to select a single measurement provider for all of Russia.
82 
Latin America has a single provider of television ratings as well, although in this case it 
is a for-profit media research firm. IBOPE Media, a subsidiary of the Brazilian Institute of 
Public Opinion and Statistics, is unique in that it conducts multi-country ratings. It provides 
television audience measurement in eleven countries throughout the region. Countries it serves 
include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, which encompass a population 18% larger than 
the U.S.
83  
Television ratings in Canada follow the global pattern as well. Two television-rating 
services have been operating there, BBM Canada and Nielsen Media Research. BBM is a not-
for-profit organization, owned and operated by broadcasters, advertising agencies, and 
advertising companies. In July 2004, however, BBM and Nielsen announced an agreement to 
merge their TV ratings.
84 Advertisers, whose costs are directly affected by television ratings, 
reacted positively to the announcement. One such media buyer predicted that a single ratings 
                                                 
79 See Alex Benady. Watch this space - Barb's chief may seem softly softly, but the ratings body must face up to its 
critics. FIN.  TIMES. Sep 28 2004, at 1. See also, GfK Group, Management Report for the GfK Group,  at 
http://www.gfk.com/english/investor/finanzberichte/gb2003eng/einzelseiten/gb2003_p090.html (last visited 
Sept. 28, 2005). 
80 Alex Benady. Watch this space - Barb's chief may seem softly softly, but the ratings body must face up to its 
critics, FIN. TIMES. Sep 28 2004, at 1. 
81 OzTAM, at http://www.oztam.com.au/html/about.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2005).  
82  Alexander Naghalov & Natalia Rostova, A Ratings Impasse. WPS: WHAT THE PAPERS SAY. Sept. 8, 2004. 
83 Charles Dawson. Rating Latin America: Regional overview Our five-part feature analyzes the viewing habits of 
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source would avoid the confusion inherent in multiple ratings and cut subscriber costs by 
eliminating the need to purchase two sets of conflicting measurements.
85 Since ratings are 
important for negotiating prices and advertising contracts with broadcasters and cable 
companies, a single set of ratings can provide a standard for negotiations, clarifying contracts 
and thus reducing enforcement or litigation costs. Similar standardization issues arose in U.S. 
media ratings in the early years. In 1950, one radio station was so fed up with the inconsistent 
numbers offered by competing ratings services that it sponsored a full-page local newspaper ad 
headed “Two Umpires Behind the Plate Isn’t Any Good in Broadcasting, Either.”
86 
c.  Lessons Learned  
The available evidence suggests that there are a few key potential competitors that can 
limit Nielsen’s ability to wield market power. Other firms possess the necessary skills to 
provide television ratings, and internal industry players have the resources to provide ratings if 
Nielsen were to abuse its position. Indeed, new technologies are under development that could 
limit Nielsen’s market power, and perhaps even displace Nielsen altogether. 
Our review of media ratings across the globe also suggests that market forces may lead 
toward standardization of ratings. Arbitron ceased providing U.S. television ratings in 1993, 
citing lack of profits as the primary reason. On the end user side, advertisers note transaction 
costs as a reason to support a single ratings source. For instance, The World Federation of 
Advertisers argues that  
if other research suppliers provide rival surveys this can be wasteful in terms of 
the deployment of financial resources available in the market. The money 
required for two adequate television panels would fund one good panel. It is also 
wasteful in terms of agency resource[s] in that multiple data sets have to be 
purchased and reconciled.
87  
                                                                                                                                                           
84 Laura Bracken, BBM and Nielsen set to merge on TV ratings, PLAYBACK. July 19, 2004.  
85 Id. 
86 Bill Davidson, Who Knows Who’s on Top?, reprinted in History Matters, supra note 23.  
87 WFA Media Committee, The WFA/EACA Guide to the Organization of Television Audience Research, (Jan. 
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Unlike state-sanctioned monopolies, then, the push toward a single provider in media 
ratings appears to come from both economies of scale and from customer preference. 
Moreover, scale in media ratings provision does not appear to create an insurmountable barrier 
to entry as it frequently does for state monopolies, such as regulated utilities.  
We therefore conclude that significant abuse of market power is not apparent. Media 
ratings clients tend to push for a single standard, which tends to be provided by a single firm. In 
principle, this firm could have some market power, but we believe this power is limited by the 
specter of potential competition. Evidently, regulators in most countries agree with our 
assessment. Most countries throughout the world have one firm, or at least one dominant firm, 
providing television ratings. What is especially striking about the global pattern is the lack of 
regulation across diverse regions, even in areas far more prone to government intervention than 
the United States, such as the European Union. One possible reason we do not see such 
regulation anywhere in the world is that there is no clear evidence of a significant market 
failure.  
Without a clear market failure, there is not a strong economic rationale for regulation.
88 
We, nonetheless, consider the two other regulatory questions we raised at the beginning 
because they provide insight into the likely impact of implementing proposed alternatives.  
B.  Feasibility of the Regulatory Plan 
To understand whether there is a workable regulatory plan we examine the primary 
oversight mechanism that is in place now—the Media Rating Council.  
1.  Existing Oversight 
The Media Rating Council (MRC) grew out of a much earlier controversy over media 
ratings, one that culminated in House hearings in the early 1960s.
89 The final report that 
emerged from those hearings summarized the importance of media ratings: 
                                                 
88 There could be other rationales for regulation, such as the distribution of income. However, regulation is not a 
particularly effective method for redistributing income. See e.g., Keith J. Arrow et. al., Is There a Role for 
Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCIENCE, 221, 221-222 (1996). 
89 Note that the Federal Communications Commission licenses and regulates broadcast operations in the public 
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Rightly or wrongly, sponsors react to the audience rating systems. Millions of 
dollars turn on the ratings levels. The immediate and long-range future of all 
types of programs––news reports, mysteries, comedies, westerns, etc.––are 
controlled by the ratings which each show receives. If this rating system is to 
continue we must make certain that the rating received is the rating achieved––
no more, and no less.
90 
A number of industry players agreed with this sentiment and in late 1963 voluntarily 
formed the Broadcast Rating Council, Inc., the predecessor to the MRC.
91 The Council is non-
profit and membership dues fund its activities. The initial members included a number of media 
associations, such as The National Association of Broadcasters, The Radio Advertising Bureau, 
and the Television Advertising Bureau. Individual networks joined as well, including ABC, 
CBS, and NBC. These same organizations are still members today, along with cablecasters, 
advertisers, advertising agencies, and Internet organizations.
92  
The council’s objectives were clearly delineated at the time. In particular, the council 
specified four goals:
93  
1.  To secure for the broadcasting industry and related users audience measurement 
services that are valid, reliable, effective, and viable; 
2.  To evolve and determine minimum criteria and standards for broadcast audience 
measurement services; 
3.  To establish and administer a system of accreditation for broadcast audience 
measurement services; 
4.  To provide and administer an audit system designed to insure users that broadcast 
audience measurements are conducted in conformance with the criteria, standards and 
procedures developed. 
The second point resulted in the Council issuing its first set of voluntary minimum 
standards in early 1964. The standards, then and now, focus on two issues. The first issue 
                                                                                                                                                           
unfair and deceptive practices in interstate commerce. Neither agency had or has a direct mandate to regulate the 
activities of ratings services. H.R. DOC NO. 89-1212, at 11 (Jan. 13, 1966).  
90 Id. at 2. 
91  Id. at 2-3.  
92 For the 2004 membership list, see  Media Rating Council, 2004 Membership,  at 
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emphasizes procedural matters, such as training for interviewers, sample construction, spot-
checking for fieldwork, and overall quality controls. The second aspect, and the one driven by 
the industry problems at the time, emphasizes transparency and disclosure in ratings. Ratings 
firms should disclose their survey methods, known error rates, response rates, and any 
weighting or adjustment procedures employed.  
Transparency is relevant for the controversy today as well. With so much at stake, users 
of television ratings have strong incentives to understand how the ratings are calculated and 
how those numbers can be interpreted. Nielsen and other media ratings companies therefore 
provide considerable detail on how their ratings are constructed to aid the groups relying on 
ratings for business decisions.
94 These groups, which include broadcasters, cable companies, 
and advertisers, have an economic incentive to understand the strengths and limitations of the 
ratings. As a consequence, the argument that government intervention is needed here to protect 
consumers who do not know any better is not relevant.
95  
The third point above refers to the MRC’s accreditation procedures. Accreditation 
includes an application, a review, and an approval decision. Individual ratings companies, 
television or other media, can apply to the MRC for accreditation. The Council then designs an 
evaluation specifically for that applicant. In order to qualify for accreditation, the applicant 
must furnish all requested information, comply with the minimum standards set by the MRC, 
and pay for annual audits.
96 A committee comprised of member organizations that use the 
ratings type in question evaluates the application and makes a recommendation to the MRC 
Board of Directors. The Board is then responsible for either granting or denying accreditation.
97 
                                                                                                                                                           
93 H.R. DOC NO. 89-1212, supra note 89, at 2. 
94 See Nielsen Media Research, About Nielsen Media Research, at http://www.nielsenmedia.com/about_us.html 
(last visited Sept. 28, 2005).  
95 YVES R. SIMON, THE PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT: THE PATERNAL FUNCTION OF AUTHORITY, 
(U. of Notre Dame Press ed., 1
st ed, 1993), available at http://www.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/pdg-
1b.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2005). 
96 The audits are conducted by an independent party, such as Ernst & Young. The rating firm pays just for the 
audit costs and the MRC collects no money for this task. Audit findings are not disseminated to the public, due 
to the extensive confidential disclosures required. See Implementation of Nielsen Local People Meter TV Rating 
System: Hearing before Subcomm. on Commun. Comm .on Commerce, Sci., & Transp.. 108th Cong. 7. (2004) 
(statement of George Ivie, Executive Director of MRC).   
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If the MRC finds that an applicant is not eligible for accreditation, it identifies deficiencies, 
which if fixed will lead to accreditation. MRC procedures stipulate that any disputes should be 
heard before a three-member panel of the Board.  
Given the importance of establishing standards and ensuring measurement transparency, 
the MRC appears to plays a significant role in the media ratings process. Industry oversight 
organizations like the MRC can facilitate clear channels of communication between the 
primary parties involved––the media providers, media advertisers, and media ratings 
companies. The MRC can help media providers and media buyers understand ratings 
techniques, and can also provide a mechanism for achieving widespread acceptance of a 
particular measurement technique. In the case of local People Meters, the MRC appears to be 
working with Nielsen in a constructive fashion to address the complaints raised by certain 
Council members.
98 Any change to the MRC’s original charter, however, would need to be 
thought through carefully. It is not clear that additional responsibilities would fit easily within 
the Council’s existing framework, since so many diverse interests––from broadcasters to 
advertisers to Internet companies––are part of the MRC.  
2.  Proposed Regulation 
As mentioned earlier, the most specific media ratings regulatory proposal is a Senate 
bill entitled the Fairness, Accuracy, Inclusivity, and Responsiveness in Ratings Act of 2005 (S. 
1372). A key provision would make MRC accreditation mandatory before any new television 
ratings measurement system could be provided. In other words, the Media Rating Council––an 
industry organization comprised of individual broadcasters and their associations, individual 
cable companies and their associations, and individual advertising agencies and their 
associations––would have to approve the specific plan for each local People Meter rollout. 
Nielsen would not be allowed to offer People Meters in a designated market, such as a city, 
before obtaining approval. Any new measurement systems would have to undergo a trial period 
first, with the MRC determining the length of that trial. In addition to brand new measurement 
                                                 
98 See Katy Bachman, Nielsen Feeling Heat from MRC, MEDIAWEEK, Apr. 19, 2005; See also, Allison Romano, 
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methods, any changes to existing measurement methods would qualify as “new” under the Act 
and would thus need to be accredited.  
The MRC accreditation process is currently, and has always been, voluntary.
99 While 
making certification mandatory may be feasible in theory, and is certainly simple from an 
implementation standpoint, it is possible that accreditation would need to remain voluntary to 
avoid conflicting with antitrust laws. As the list of members already makes clear, the MRC is 
composed of competitors. Networks such as NBC and ABC are fierce rivals with each other 
and with cable organizations such as Fox, Turner, and Discovery. Moreover, traditional 
networks, cable, minority language channels, advertising agencies, advertising companies, print 
media, and Internet organizations have divergent commercial interests. Some desire 
measurement techniques that maximize their own individual airtime revenues; others desire 
measurement techniques that assist in planning effective multimedia ad campaigns at minimal 
cost. As a result, some of these organizations are likely to benefit from a proposed change in 
ratings measurement while others could be harmed by it. Cable companies, who tend to gain 
from electronic measures, and broadcast networks, which sometimes benefit from poor recall 
with paper-based measures, will frequently be in this position.
100 If these competing 
organizations are required to vote on mandatory accreditation, potentially delaying the 
commercial launch of a new method, it could represent a restraint of trade.
101  
To summarize, the proposed regulation does appear feasible in theory but fraught with 
implementation problems. Depending on a legal review of antitrust issues,
102 making 
                                                 
99 H.R. DOC NO. 89-1212, supra note 89, at 4. 
100 See the discussion supra, II.A.1. 
101 See Jonathan T. Howe & Leland J. Badger, The Antitrust Challenge to Non-Profit Certification Organizations: 
Conflicts of Interest And a Practical Rule of Reason Approach to Certification Programs as Industry-Wide 
Builders of Competition and Efficiency, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 357, 373, 386 (1982-1983). For more on this 
consideration as it pertains to media ratings, see Letter from Susan Whiting, CEO of Nielsen Media Research, to 
Senator Charles Schumer, (August 2, 2004), available at 
http://www.nielsenmedia.com/forclients/SDW%20Response%20to%20Sen%20Schumer%207-29-04.pdf.  
102 The National Association of Broadcasters sought clarification on the legality of MRC voluntary accreditation 
from the Department of Justice after the 1964 hearings. William Orrick, then Assistant Attorney General of the 
Antitrust Division, neither dismissed nor confirmed concerns over the antitrust status of accreditation. In 
particular, he wrote, “The Department is concerned, however, that in operation the proposal [establishment of 
voluntary minimum standards for accreditation of broadcast rating services] may have the effect of a boycott of 
non-approved services and may result in stifling innovation[ ] and other forms of competition in providing 
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accreditation by the MRC a requirement before introducing any new measurement service or 
making any change to an existing one is a straightforward matter relying on existing 
infrastructure. Nonetheless, mandatory accreditation does not appear advisable given the 
diversity of goals within the membership of the MRC. We explore the costs and benefits, a 
separate question from feasibility, below.  
C.  Regulatory Benefits and Costs  
The benefits associated with required accreditation are relatively easy to determine. 
First, as advocates of regulation suggest, mandatory certification could be used to check any 
abuse of market power wielded by a ratings firm. For example, if a proposed ratings system 
change did not represent an improvement in technology or a more efficient means of 
measurement, the MRC could prevent its rollout. Second, the standards for measurement 
quality and process transparency that the MRC encourages with its guidelines could be 
enforced under a system of mandatory certification. Ratings agencies not complying with all 
quality and disclosure rules would not receive accreditation. Finally, mandatory accreditation 
might be helpful in encouraging competition in that it could provide new ratings firms with an 
industry-recognized seal of approval. 
A number of costs associated with mandatory accreditation are easily identifiable as 
well. First, in any industry undergoing technological change, regulatory hurdles should be 
considered very carefully. A mandatory approval process has the potential to hold back 
welfare-enhancing changes because committee decisions are necessarily more time consuming 
than unilateral action.
103 In this case, rapid changes in media delivery––video on demand, 
streaming media over the Internet, and time-shifting technologies such as Tivo and ReplyTV––
are changing the industry’s media ratings requirements. Waiting for MRC accreditation could 
slow the ability of rating services to respond to these changes in a timely manner.  
                                                                                                                                                           
proceedings against the proposal.”  Letter from William Orrick, Assistant Attorney General, Department of 
Justice, to Douglas A. Anello, Gen. Couns., Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters (July 16, 1964). 
103 See Tim Simcoe, Committees and the Creation of Technical Standards (Working Paper for the University of 
California at Berkeley, Haas School of Business, 2003); See also, Debra A. Valentine, Gen. Couns. of FTC, 
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Second, because the MRC is composed of media ratings users, there will always be 
groups within the Council that have a vested interest in the ratings tools used. Some users are 
likely to benefit economically from a measurement change while others would be hurt. The 
accreditation process thus has the potential to be manipulated by those interested in private rent 
seeking.
104  
Consider the political efforts involved in the current controversy. Shows broadcast by 
the Fox Television Stations Group, a division of the News Corporation, were particularly hard 
hit in test runs of local People Meters in New York City.
105 Rupert Murdoch’s News 
Corporation, and the lobbying groups it has funded, subsequently spent between $5 and $7 
million dollars mobilizing public opinion against Nielsen’s local People Meters.
106 In response, 
Nielsen spent roughly the same––$4 to $6 million––on lobbying aimed at defending its 
technology, research quality, and impartiality.
107 It seems reasonable to expect such 
expenditures on a regular basis under a system that requires mandatory accreditation. Each 
media faction that stood to lose ground relative to its competitors would likely be encouraged 
to engage in public relations efforts to influence the accreditation outcome, or at least to slow 
down acceptance of the new method. Delaying the process of accreditation could produce 
substantial economic gains for certain businesses. 
                                                                                                                                                           
Industry Self-Regulation and Antitrust Enforcement: An Evolving Relationship (May 24, 1998), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/dvisraelspeech.htm.  
104 For example, conflicts of interest led to an SEC investigation that prompted NASD to split into two separate 
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Companies” (Mar. 5, 2002), available at http://banking.senate.gov/02_03hrg/030502/glauber.htm.   
105 See Hernandez  & Elliott, supra note 13; See also, Rating the Ratings. Editorial, N.Y. TIMES. Aug. 25 2005, at 
22. 
106  Id. (Figures as of summer 2005). Along with “Don’t Count Us Out,” News Corp has funded various 
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Report: News Corp. Courts Democrats. CNN    MONEY, Aug. 9, 2005, at 
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Lobbyists. THE  HILL,  Sept. 27, 2005, available at 
http://www.hillnews.com/thehill/export/TheHill/News/Frontpage/081005/news.html.  
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Similar issues arise in other standard setting situations. Consider, for example, standard 
setting groups for Internet technology. The Internet Engineering Task Force (more commonly 
known as the IETF) “is a large open international community of network designers, operators, 
vendors, and researchers concerned with the evolution of the Internet architecture and the 
smooth operation of the Internet.”
108 For industry participants, Internet protocol and design 
decisions can have a dramatic impact on their business and their profits. Empirical research 
suggests that as the stakes increase, an uneven distribution of benefits from adopting a standard 
tends to prolong the committee decision-making process.
109 In other words, when some 
members stand to gain while others stand to lose, committee decision-making gets bogged 
down and standard setting is delayed. We would expect similar results with mandatory 
accreditation in media ratings.
110  
Finally, mandatory accreditation could hinder competition in the ratings industry. 
Accreditation would represent a barrier to entry for potential entrants into the ratings 
business.
111 Thus, mandating that firms have a seal of approval has costs as well as benefits. 
Industry insiders without a vested interest in ratings outcomes have generally argued for 
maintaining the voluntary nature of the accreditation process. In his testimony before the 
Senate in 2004, George Ivie, the Executive Director and CEO of the MRC, observed, “Nielsen 
                                                 
108 The Internet Engineering Task Force, Overview, at http://www.ietf.org/overview.html (last visited Sept. 28, 
2005). 
109 Simcoe, supra note 103.  
110 Another frequent theme in the standards literature is that of path dependence. See Joseph Farrell & Garth 
Saloner, Standardization, compatibility, and innovation, 16(1) RAND J. ECON. 70, 70-83 (1985). Some argue, 
for example, that a quirk of history can set a standard on the path to acceptance even when other, technically 
superior options are available. One such example raised in the literature is the QWERTY keyboard. See Paul 
David, 75 Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, AM. ECON. REV. 332 (1985).  While these arguments are based 
on formal mathematical models, it is important to remember that they are just models. As Liebowitz and 
Margolis argue “…the economic models of path dependence fail to capture what is important about the working 
of real-world markets. That is why, for all their formal correctness, for all their internal consistency, these 
models fail to capture what is borne out in the real world.” See STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEVEN E. MARGOLIS, 
Winners, Losers and Microsoft 50 (1999). In the particular case of media ratings, it seems unlikely that 
Nielsen’s measurements represent the “wrong” standard. Up through 1993, Nielsen competed directly with 
Arbitron in television ratings; Arbitron could have been chosen as the standard but was not. Before that, in the 
mid 1980s, a series of challengers attempted to push Nielsen out––one was even sponsored by the broadcast 
networks. These episodes suggest that opportunities to shift standards have in fact arisen, but were not taken to 
conclusion. Were Nielsen the “wrong” standard, industry participants would have had strong incentives to 
support one of these challengers.  
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will fix the problems we bring in front of them. It takes time and they have to do it right and 
eventually things will get accredited and work.”
112 Certainly Nielsen has faced some 
difficulties in implementing People Meters in some cities, especially in establishing accurate 
samples.
113 But Nielsen does not have a vested interest in a particular ratings result. It does, 
however, have a  profit motive for advancing sound ratings methods, because this could 
enhance its reputation and add to its bottom line. As one advertising agency representative 
noted at the start of the present controversy:  
I don’t know anyone who believes that electronic devices aren’t a better way to 
capture information rather than someone’s memory. The diary system was 
invented when there were basically three networks and the entire family 
watched TV on one set, and so it was very easy to mark down what shows were 
watched.
114  
The issue, then, is not one of moving to an untested technology, but rather one of 
moving to a well-tested, improved technology in a careful and accurate way. There seem to be 
issues in implementing this technology in local markets, but the voluntary MRC system is 
already well equipped to oversee this task. In the end, we believe that the potential benefits 
from moving to a mandatory accreditation system do not justify the probable costs.  
If the MRC does not move to mandatory accreditation, another regulatory possibility is 
government oversight. The case for general regulation is even harder to make, though. The 
debate at hand is over television ratings measurement quality. No evidence of fraud has been 
put forth, nor are public health or safety issues involved. Given the circumstances, the findings 
that emerged from the House investigation into the media ratings industry in the mid 1960s are 
still relevant today. As the 1966 Harris Report concluded, “It is highly doubtful, however, that 
Government regulation of the operation of rating services, at this time at least, is likely to be 
more effective than a well-administered program of industry self-regulation.”
115 The reason is 
that the government has far less information on the appropriate quality standards than the 
                                                 
112 Per July 2004 testimony of George Ivie, supra note 96.  
113  Toni Fitzgerald, People Meter Hits an LA Speed Bump, MEDIA  LIFE, Mar. 18, 2004, available at 
http://www.medialifemagazine.com/news2004/mar04/mar15/4_thurs/news3thursday.html.  
114 Jane Collins, vice president of release for Adlink, as quoted in Meg James, Nielsen Meters Will Alter Local TV 
Ratings, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003, at B1. 
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industry players themselves. Add in the government’s relatively slow response time, and it 
appears that government regulation of media ratings could easily do more harm than good if it 
were adopted.
116 The FTC has agreed with this view, noting that voluntary self-regulation via 
the Media Rating Council appear to be working and are “more transparent and reliable” than 
government regulation would be.
117 
III.  THE  ECONOMIC  ARGUMENT  FOR  DEREGULATING  CREDIT AND BOND 
RATINGS 
While the media industry struggles with the question of regulating the provision of 
television ratings, the finance industry is grappling with the detrimental effects of the ratings 
regulation it already has. Credit and bond ratings firms, such as Moody’s and Standard and 
Poor’s, provide a standardized measure for evaluating creditworthiness. These ratings firms 
evaluate business and government offerings of debt instruments to investors.
118 They estimate 
the likelihood of a firm defaulting on a loan. The familiar letter grades for bonds issued by 
Moody’s––Aaa, Ba, C, and so on––can help investors make more informed choices about 
purchasing debt instruments. In addition, a bond’s rating affects the interest a bond issuer must 
pay to attract purchasers.
119  
Before a firm can provide bond ratings, it must obtain a license from the SEC. Critics 
contend that regulation in this area has been fraught with unintended consequences, creating 
new problems instead of solving existing ones. As a result, Congress is considering altering the 
mandatory SEC accreditation process. In this section, we analyze the economics of bond and 
credit ratings regulation, covering the same three questions as for media ratings.  
                                                 
116 Debra A. Valentine, General Counsel of FTC, Remarks before The Interdisciplinary Center Herzlia, The Arison 
School of Business, & The Israeli Antitrust Authority: Industry Self-Regulation and Antitrust Enforcement: An 
Evolving Relationship (May 24, 1998), available at  http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/dvisraelspeech.htm; 
Solveig Singleton, Regulatory Obstacles to Innovation: Is Self-Regulation The Answer?, THE CATO INST. (Sept. 
13, 1999). 
117  FTC tells congress to stay out of US TV ratings row, RES. Apr. 13, 2005, available at http://www.research-
live.com/index.aspx?pageid=30&newsid=828. 
118 David Ellis, Different Sides of the Same Story: Investors’ and Issuers’ Views of Rating Agencies (Babson 
College Working Paper, 1997). 
119 Bill Rini& Mike Tinnemeir, Bonds – Moody Bond Ratings, Nov. 12, 2002, available at  http://invest-
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A.  A Brief History of Bond Ratings 
The early history of credit and bond ratings firms follows a pattern similar to media 
ratings: information asymmetries between buyers and sellers created an opening for 
independent rating firms. Starting in 1909, John Moody published the first bond rating for 
railroad bonds.
120 A few years later, in 1916, the Standard Statistics Company––the “Standard” 
in today’s Standard & Poor––entered the market.
 Fitch Publishing Company entered shortly 
thereafter, in 1924. Corporate financial disclosure in these early years was quite limited, so the 
three bond raters served a useful purpose in smoothing information discrepancies between bond 
sellers (borrowers) and bond buyers (lenders).
121 The bond raters sold their ratings directly to 
investors in the form of manuals, a viable business model at time given that photocopy 
machines, computers, and the Internet were all yet to be invented. 
In the 1970s, bond raters shifted from selling directly to investors toward selling 
directly to issuers. Some scholars have speculated that low-cost photocopy played an important 
role in the move, while others point to the contribution made by certain historical events in the 
financial community.
122  Regardless of the cause, today’s credit and bond raters work with 
issuers in evaluating offerings, and they are paid by those issuers. The vast majority of bond 
issuers request ratings, referred to as “solicited” ratings.
123 The issuer pays the rating firm a 
one-time fee and assists that firm with any additional information it needs. The rating firms 
then make the resulting ratings public. Unsolicited ratings are those that the ratings firms 
                                                 
120 See GILBERT HAROLD, BOND RATINGS AS AN INVESTMENT GUIDE: AN APPRAISAL OF THEIR EFFECTIVENESS 
(1938). Note that bond rating was not the first form of financial rating. Credit rating agencies first began to 
appear in the mid 1800s.  Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, The Credit Rating Industry, FED. RES. BOARD N.Y. 
Q. REV. 1 (1994). 
121 Securities and Exchange Commission rules regarding corporate financial disclosure were not promulgated until 
1933. Note that developing economies still face significant information asymmetries. According to an article in 
The Economist, “When representatives in Kenya of three of the world's largest banks were asked what single 
event would most encourage their institutions to become more involved with microfinance, they all came up 
with the same answer: the presence of credit-rating agencies.” Critical Acceptance, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 5, 
2005.  
122 In particular, the Penn-Central bankruptcy in 1970 may have increased issuers’ willingness to pay for high 
quality bond ratings to distinguish themselves from rivals. Lawrence J. White, Good Intentions Gone Awry: A 
Policy Analysis of the SEC’s Regulation of the Bond Ratings Industry at 5 (Working paper presented at AEI 
Conference “Improving the Credit Rating Industry,” 2005). 
123 Lawrence J. White, The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis,  in R ATINGS, RATING 
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provide without funds or information from the rated company. This is a relatively rare 
occurrence.
124 Virtually all corporate bond issuers prefer the opportunity to present their 
financial information directly to a rater and thus avoid unsolicited ratings.
125 
B.  The Market Failures Justifying Government Intervention 
Credit and bond rating firms operated for many years without any regulation at all. The 
Great Depression, which saw an unprecedented number of bank failures,
126 brought on the first 
round of regulation affecting the rating firms. In 1931 the U.S. Treasury Department, through 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency which regulates nationally chartered banks, 
officially required banks to use current market prices for any bonds in their portfolio that were 
below “investment grade” as published in “recognized rating manuals.”
127 The purpose of the 
move was to require banks to more accurately reflect the level of risk their investments were 
exposed to. In 1936, the Comptroller moved to an even stronger stance on risk, mandating that 
banks could not even hold bonds that were below investment grade.
128 The provision is one 
facet of the so-called “safety and soundness” regulations for banks intended to prevent bank 
failures.
129  
The market failure behind the 1936 law was clear to all at the time. When a bank fails, it 
can create harm for businesses and consumers, especially if there is a widespread loss in 
confidence.
130 The government felt that depositors were unable to distinguish a financially 
                                                 
124 It is also quite controversial. Some companies have accused bond ratings firms of issuing low unsolicited 
ratings as a threat to push companies to solicit ratings from them. Moody’s was accused of this tactic in 1993, 
but was successful in court. See Jefferson County School District No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Services, Inc., 
175 F.3d 848 (10
th Cir. 1999). For a discussion of this case, bond raters in litigation, and the broader issue of 
unsolicited ratings, see Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Ratings Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, 
(2005) (Working Paper, presented at Nomura-Brookings Seminar on Financial Gatekeepers, 2005). 
125 Ellis, supra note 118, at 2.  
126 Over the course of 1930, 1350 banks suspended operations. See  America’s Great Depression at 
http://www.amatecon.com/gd/gdtimeline.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2005).  
127 Investment grade is generally set at the “BBB” rating level. Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, The Credit Rating 
Industry, FED. RES. BOARD N.Y. Q. REV. 6 (1994). 
128  Id. at 6; White, supra note 122, at 5. 
129  Cantor & Packer, supra note 127.; White, supra note 122, at 1-2. 
130 The Great Depression marks a notable period in the history of bank failures. By 1933, depositors witnessed the 
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sound bank from a risky one, primarily due to information asymmetries.
131 Thus the purpose of 
the safety and soundness laws is understandable. Worried about continued bank failures 
triggered by poor investments, the government sought to establish a level of risk above which 
national banks could not invest. The new rule had a far-reaching impact. Of the approximately 
2,000 listed and publicly traded bond issues available at the time, over 1,000 did not meet the 
definition of “investment grade.” Thus, the rule drastically reduced viable investments.
132 In 
addition, the government effectively created a guaranteed market for credit and bond raters. 
Despite its well-intentioned origins, the investment grade regulation had problems from 
the start. The Comptroller’s ruling mentioned “recognized rating manuals,” but did not specify 
whose manuals were recognized. The industry generally understood the phrase to cover the 
three incumbent general-purpose bond raters, Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. The regulation, 
however, did not rule out other raters and made no mention of new entrants to the bond ratings 
field. Without the assurance of legitimate ratings, though, the risk ceiling holds little meaning 
in practice. For instance, if unscrupulous raters could be found, they could issue any grade for a 
price, rendering “investment grade” vacuous. 
The problem of defining recognized ratings manuals led to the next round of regulation, 
albeit quite slowly, in 1975. In that year, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
designated bond rating firms as “nationally recognized statistical rating organizations” 
(NRSROs), requiring SEC approval for all raters before they can start operations.
133 The three 
firms operating prior to the law were all grandfathered in as NRSROs. Again, the motivation 
behind the regulation is easy to understand. The initial rules regarding bank investment 
portfolios had created a new government-induced failure––bond rating manipulation. By 
                                                                                                                                                           
had failed. See Living History Farm, at http://www.livinghistoryfarm.org/farminginthe30s/money_08.html (last 
visited Oct. 27, 2005).  
131 David Miles, Optimal Regulation of Deposit Taking Financial Intermediaries, 39 EUR. ECON. REV. 1365, 1365-
1384 (1995). 
132 Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 
77 WASH. U. L.Q. 620, 688 (1999). 
133 See Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee, SEC Standards For Designating Nationally Recognized Credit 
Rating Organizations, Dec. 9, 2002, available at 
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25,filter.all/pub_detail.asp. A few other specialized raters exist, but only 
three firms provide general-purpose debt ratings. For a detailed evaluation of SEC regulation, see White, supra 
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designating who could and who could not provide bond ratings, the SEC hoped to eliminate 
this loophole. 
Once again, however, the new rules created new problems even as they solved old ones. 
The SEC never specified the criteria by which a firm might be admitted to recognized status.
134 
The first new admissions were in the early 1980s, with a couple more in the early 1990s. At 
neither point did the SEC clarify how and why it had approved the new firms. There was no 
formal regulatory review, and proceedings were not transparent. Moreover, very few new 
designations were made––perhaps because of the ambiguity in accreditation requirements.  
The bond rating industry, like the media ratings industry, is now and has always been 
small. Today only three general-purpose bond raters exist: Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch, with 
Moody’s being the largest.
135 Over the full history of the bond ratings industry, 1909 to the 
present, there have never been more than 5 firms in operation.
136 As one industry scholar 
observed, “the fewness of the bond rating firms contrasts sharply with the thousands of stock 
analysts, employed by hundreds of securities firms, who regularly offer opinions about 
companies’ equity share price prospects.”
137 The traditional economic factors of economies of 
scope and scale are part of the reason, since the raters must build their expertise and reputation 
across a multitude of industries offering bonds.
138 But another reason lies behind the 
concentration found in bond ratings, one that sounds remarkably close to media buyers’ 
comments over the benefits of conformity in media ratings: “lenders (bondholders) may well 
prefer having only a few standardized ratings and raters, so that the lenders can more readily 
make comparison of the ratings…”
139 On top of these market forces already at work, it seems 
                                                 
134 White, supra note 122, at 7.  
135 Moody’s rates 20,000 public and private issuers in the United States and around 1,200 non-U.S. issuers. S&P 
rates slightly fewer issues in each category. Partnoy, supra note 132. 
136 White, supra note 123, at 8. 
137 Id. at 10. 
138 Varian observes that returns to scale are a common feature of information goods, such as ratings. See Hal 
Varian, Markets for Information Goods (UC Berkeley Working Paper, 1998). 
139 White, supra note 123, at 11-12. White reiterates this view in a later paper as well. See White, supra note 122, 
at 4. David Ellis concurs: “If a rating from one agency is not viewed as conveying the same information as one 
from another agency one would expect one of two things to occur. Investors will either examine the ratings of as 
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clear that the SEC regulation has further limited entry.
140 In the thirty years of licensing rules 
for bond ratings, only 6 entrants have been permitted, and all of them have subsequently 
consolidated with other raters or have exited the market altogether.
141 
 Some scholars have argued that the SEC’s recognition rule has had the unintended 
consequence of lowering the value of credit and bond ratings.
142 For example, White contends 
that the SEC’s safety-and-soundness regulation of financial institutions, which requires the 
institutions to use credit and bond ratings in their decisions to purchase or hold debt 
instruments, has artificially raised prices in the ratings industry. Regulation-induced demand 
coupled with the recognized rater designation, which creates a barrier to entry, has harmed the 
overall industry.
143 In his analysis of the industry, Partnoy makes an even stronger argument 
against existing regulations. He maintains that the protected status for raters engendered by 
SEC rules has led to a “decline in the informational value of credit ratings, [and] also creat[ed] 
incentives for the agencies to provide inaccurate ratings …”
144 He concludes that “the 
overriding message is that regulatory licenses are costly. They create oligopolistic pressure, and 
exacerbate rent-seeking among already concentrated industries.”
145 In other words, regulation 
has tended to increase the market power held by ratings firms. 
C.  Evaluating the Proposed Regulatory Change 
In light of past regulatory failures, in 2005 Congress proposed a new round of 
modifications to the rules governing credit and bond ratings. A bill introduced in the House in 
2005––The Credit Rating Agency Duopoly Relief Act––calls for eliminating the recognized 
rater designation and replacing it with a more flexible SEC registration process intended to 
                                                                                                                                                           
consider to be the most reliable and consistent… From the results [presented here], it seems that the second 
option is the one pursued by most institutional investors…” Ellis, supra note 118, at 16-17. 
140 White, supra note 123, at 13-14. For more on the negative effects of SEC regulation, see Partnoy, supra note 
132. 
141 White, supra note 123, at 13. 
142 In addition to those mentioned in the text, see Alex J. Pollack, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC 
POLICY RESEARCH, END THE GOVERNMENT SPONSORED CARTEL IN CREDIT RATINGS (2005). 
143 White, supra note 123, at 22-28. 
144 Partnoy, supra note 132, at 623-624. 









146 Under this plan, firms could provide credit and bond ratings simply by 
registering with the SEC. Thus, the plan appears feasible. It is modeled on other financial rules 
and could reduce the regulatory burden currently placed on the SEC.  
A cost-benefit analysis of the Duopoly Relief Act is somewhat complicated since 
broader banking regulations are confounded with the narrower aspects of rating firms. The 
proposed Act could be successful in encouraging competition in the bond ratings industry by 
permitting “the 130-plus non-NRSRO agencies to compete with NRSROs.”
147 It might also 
enable entirely new companies to enter the ratings market. Expanding competition can be a 
tangible benefit, although in this case, where standards are clearly important, it may not be. 
Recall that the industry was concentrated long before the regulatory barriers to entry were 
imposed. Nonetheless, even if market forces maintain the oligopolistic nature of bond ratings, 
removing artificial barriers to entry is still a good idea. Moreover, the administrative costs 
appear to be minimal, since they simply shift accreditation to registration within the same 
government agency. On the other hand, the proposed bill does not address the root causes of the 
problems, which lie in regulations aimed at banks, not those directed at credit and bond rating 
firms. For instance, White argues for shifting all safety and soundness determinations onto the 
banks themselves, with regulatory oversight by the SEC. This step would separate banking 
regulations from rating regulations, and would therefore eliminate the regulation-induced 
demand for ratings.
148 It would also eliminate altogether the need for any SEC recognized 
status for credit and bond raters.
149 Garnering support for such a strong move would likely be 
difficult, though.  
In the end, a cost-benefit assessment of the Duopoly Relief Act requires an assessment 
of the political environment. While the bill may not go far enough, as White and others argue, it 
                                                 
146 H.R. 2990. 109 Cong. (June 20, 2005), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.2990.IH 
(last visited  Nov. 29, 2005). 
147 Partnoy, supra note 145, at 55. 
148 Of course, a separate cost-benefit analysis would need to be conducted to determine whether this move 
enhanced banking efficiency. We just consider ratings firms here. 
149 See White, supra note 123, at 15. The proposed legislation may be challenged on constitutional grounds as 
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does offer an improvement over the status quo for the credit and bond ratings market, and we 
therefore believe that it represents a step in the right direction.  
Aside from the specific lessons of regulating credit and bond ratings, this industry’s 
story provides a more general cautionary tale for policy makers. As White concludes, “The 
good intentions [of the SEC] were to improve safety-and-soundness regulation of financial 
institutions, and even to use ‘market’ information to do so. But the unfortunate result has been a 
distortionary entry restriction regime with respect to bond rating firms.”
150 It is reasonable to 
expect similar problems in media and other ratings industries. Like the SEC and its lack of 
transparent accreditation procedures, the MRC’s accreditation process tends to be informal. 
Mandatory approval of media rating techniques could easily translate into opaque barriers to 
entry in television ratings. The broader lesson is that regulation often has unintended 
consequences that can shift an industry in undesirable ways, raising prices and ultimately 
harming the very consumers that the regulation was intended to protect.
151 
IV.  A BROADER LOOK AT RATING FIRMS 
We have now considered two important ratings markets operating in two very different 
industries. The exact form of the ratings differs between the two as well: media ratings measure 
past performance while bond ratings measure expected performance. Despite the lack of 
commonality, we see some striking similarities in the provision of bond and media ratings: the 
information asymmetries that led to the original ratings providers, the long-term concentration 
in the ratings markets, end user preferences for a rating standard, and a history of rater freedom 
in determining ratings measurement methods. The two case studies thus raise the question of 
whether broader parallels exist across a number of industries that rely on ratings. Here, we 
consider several other ratings applications in an attempt to shed light on that question. After 
noting the prevalence of ratings firms throughout the economy and summarizing their basic 
features, we discuss two more ratings industries with relevant lessons for regulation. 
                                                 
150 White supra note 123, at 2. 
151 Sam Peltzman, Professor, U. Chi., Lecture presented at the AEI-Brookings Joint Center, Regulation and the 
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A.  Ratings Throughout the Economy 
Regardless of the industry, ratings firms can provide a standard for making 
comparisons, enabling buyers and sellers to negotiate and transact more efficiently. In some 
instances, third party ratings and evaluation services can help to “pierce the fog of asymmetric 
information,” enabling more informed purchases.
152 For example, the three large consumer 
credit agencies provide information to prospective lenders and employers on an individual’s 
creditworthiness. BusinessWeek and US News & World Report, along with several other news 
publications, provide business school rankings to help their readers choose among schools;
153 
and Michelin provides ratings information to prospective diners on the quality and service of 
restaurants. In other instances, the presence of a rater who measures performance against some 
threshold enables purchases to be blissfully ignorant of quality without suffering any 
consequences.
154 In this category, the Good Housekeeping seal and Underwriters Lab labels 
help consumers select high quality products without having to learn anything about them. 
These are just a few examples of the ratings organizations that operate in the economy today––-
all of which emerged to fill an informational need and survive on the basis of their 
reputations.
155  
Table 1 provides an overview of different kinds of rating and certification 
organizations.
156 The first column presents the industry. As the table illustrates, in several 
                                                 
152 White, supra note 123, at 41-63. See KATZ & ROSEN, supra note 53, at 398-399.  
153 This ratings industry has evidently proliferated in recent years. As The Economist observed recently, “In the 
absence of a single incontrovertible measure of performance, the rankings provide a degree of accountability in 
an educational niche where there is too little. …surveys show, however, that the more the lists proliferate and 
differ, the less attention students pay to them.” The Year of Listing Differently, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 22, 2005. 
154 Daniel B. Klein, The Demand for and Supply of Assurance, in M ARKET F AILURE  OR S UCCESS: THE NEW 
DEBATE 181 (Tyler Cowen & Eric Crampton eds., 2002). 
155 In addition to reducing informational disparities between parties, some of these ratings organizations contribute 
new information to all parties. See Ginger Jin, Andrew Kato, & John List, That’s News To Me! Information 
Revelation in Professional Certification Markets (Working Paper, 2005) citing David Blackwell, Equivalent 
Comparison Of Experiments, 24 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICAL STATS, 265, 265-272 (1953). Information creation 
appears to be part of the ratings process with product safety testing, educational testing, and media ratings, to 
name a few. 
156 Ours is a thorough but not exhaustive listing of ratings markets. We consider private sector formal 
organizations, for-profit and non-profit, only. Government ratings are excluded, as are online only ratings 
websites. We define ratings firms as entities providing an ordinal measure of some aspect of a product or 
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instances a number of different kinds of ratings firms operate within a single industry. The next 
two columns show the kinds of information the rating firms provide. For example, within the 
media industry video game raters provide information on the age appropriateness of individual 
video games, enabling game purchasers––parents among them––to make better decisions on 
which games to buy. Note that several different rating models are included in the table. Some 
firms, like Nielsen Media Research, measure performance according to a scale. Others, like 
auto safety testers, measure performance and indicate a “passing” grade. The fourth column 
names the predominant rating firm (or firms) operating in the market. The fifth column shows 
the total number of rating firms, which provides a crude measure of industry structure. The 
second to last column lists key users of the ratings. The final column indicates the presence of 
any regulation or oversight. 
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Table 1: U.S. Ratings and Certification Organizations  
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Table 1 Continued: U.S. Ratings & Accreditation Organizations 
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157 The federal government uses Common Criteria Certification (an ISO standard) before purchase of IT products 
to assess the security and assurance. See Actional Achieves EAL Assurance Critical Security Certification, 
Wireless News, Feb. 11, 2005. 
158 Niche players also exist among raters in various industries. In product environmental friendliness, one such 
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The rating firms in the table share some common characteristics that have a direct 
bearing on the need for regulation. For example, most rating firms operate in highly 
concentrated markets. Only restaurant reviewers face significant direct competition, and that is 
largely due to local market considerations, where each local newspaper and local travel guide 
typically offers restaurant reviews. When limited to nationally known reviewers, the restaurant 
ratings market is concentrated as well, with just a few raters. While around 18 product safety 
testing firms are currently in operation, Underwriter’s Lab has around 50% to 60% of that 
market when measured by revenue.
159 In all other cases listed in the table, between 1 and 5 
rating companies comprise the entire market.  
A key conceptual challenge is explaining the size and number of firms in different 
ratings markets. A straightforward answer to this question is not readily apparent, and we think 
several factors may be important in determining ratings market structure. We offer some 
conjectures based on our empirical analysis as well as economic theory. On the supply side, 
some kinds of ratings may involve significant fixed costs, such as setting up an infrastructure to 
sample large, diverse populations. Media ratings, bond ratings, and environmental testing all 
fall into this category. More generally, some kinds of ratings may involve economies of scale 
or scope.
160 On the demand side, market size is likely to be a key determinant of the number of 
firms. The larger the number of items to rate and the larger the demand for ratings, the more the 
market can support multiple ratings firms. Most cities have only one zoo and one aquarium, 
and many cities have neither, which translates into limited demand for animal care rating 
services. 
Another factor affecting the size distribution of rating firms in an industry is the need to 
economize on search costs by using rating firms with good reputations. If an individual is 
searching for a quality rating for a product, it may be easier to access Consumer Reports than to 
                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.chlorinefreeproducts.org/about.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2005). In the health care industry, a niche 
player is the Accreditation Association for Ambulatory Health Care. See AAAHC, at 
http://www.aaahc.org/eweb/StartPage.aspx (last visited Oct 5, 2005). In addition to niche players in health care 
accreditation, note that many of the health accreditation agencies do not accredit the same spectrum of health 
care organizations.   
159 Melissa Allison, Underwriters Labs Puts Change to Test, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, May 2, 2003, at 1. 
160 An example of scope would be product safety testing, where knowledge of one kind of product can inform 
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spend the time assessing the quality of different web sites that rate products of interest. As 
economist Herbert Simon once observed, a “wealth of information creates a poverty of 
attention.”
161 Brand name ratings firms reduce information costs for buyers in making 
purchasing decisions. Of course, there may be significant fixed costs to acquiring and 
maintaining the brand, which would suggest fewer firms where branding was more important.  
Other factors appear to be important as well in explaining the distribution of firms in the 
ratings industry. For instance, more subjective ratings, such as quality determinations in 
restaurants or business school ratings, leave more room for opinion, enabling raters to 
differentiate on the criteria they include or emphasize in their evaluations. On the other hand, 
the factors considered in rating baseball cards are well established and few in number––namely 
the condition of the edges and the surface and the centering of the printing.
162 This agreement 
leaves less room for differentiation and pushes toward market concentration.
163 
The need for a standard also appears to have a strong influence on market 
concentration. One reason for needing a standard is the presence of formal contracts that 
depend on ratings. When ratings form the basis for bilateral negotiations, as they do in 
television and radio ratings, a single standard measure may reduce transaction costs for 
firms.
164 Another reason for standard ratings is ease of comparison. Educational tests are 
standardized so that schools can compare students from diverse backgrounds. While there is 
considerable disagreement in how intelligence should be measured, strong competition in 
educational measures would defeat the purpose of testing in the first place. 
The bottom line is that a number of factors appear to be important in explaining the 
distribution of rating firms in different industries. More detailed empirical work is needed to 
                                                 
161  See H. Varian, supra note 138, at 13. 
162  See Ginger Jin, Andrew Kato, & John List, That’s News to Me! Information Revelation in Professional 
Certification Markets (Working Paper at U. Md, Jan. 2000.). 
163 In sports card ratings, new entrants differentiated on their grading, offering finer grade levels than the 
established players. Even here, there is only so much room for innovation, and hence there are only three 
significant players. Jin, Kato, & List, supra note 162. 
164 Of course, the standard measure will need to be of reasonable quality, which is another reason that the rating 
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assess the relative importance of the many relevant factors, but we suspect that agreement on 
what needs to be measured and the need for a standard are two of the more important ones. 
Another interesting theme that emerges from the examples in Table 1 is the infrequency 
of government regulation. As explained above, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
currently controls financial ratings firm entry by requiring any new firm to obtain recognized 
status prior to starting operations.
165 Similarly, in the product safety arena, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration sets the standards that private companies must use in testing 
electrical safety in the workplace;
166 and the Environmental Protection Agency licenses testers 
certifying the environmental friendliness of a product. Aside from entry into these specific 
areas, however, little government regulation is imposed on ratings firms. Moreover, even in 
finance, work-place safety, and environmental testing, the exact evaluation and rating method 
is generally left to the raters; most testing procedures are not regulated. In a few instances, such 
as automobile crash tests, the government does set a standard. Private ratings firms, however, 
are free to develop their own tests, as Consumer Reports does in assessing car safety.
167 Even 
voluntary oversight appears relatively rare, prevalent primarily among media raters.  
A closer look at a few of these raters can offer further insights on the question of when 
and how to regulate rating companies. Here we provide two brief reviews of industries where 
ratings are prevalent: education and consumer goods. These examples, in conjunction with the 
media and bond ratings analyses already presented, illustrate the factors that set ratings firms 
apart from other kinds of businesses. We first consider product safety testing. Underwriters 
Laboratory, the company that certifies whether products meet minimum safety standards, 
dominates this industry. The second example is college entrance testing. Here, the industry 
                                                 
165 See infra Section III. 
166 The program is called the Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory, and is part of OSHA’s Directorate of 
Science, Technology, and Medicine.  See  DSTM/OTPCA: Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory, at 
http://www.osha.gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
167 The private sector has an advantage over the government in that it has a positive incentive to respond to 
changes in the marketplace that could yield increased profits. This does not mean that the private ratings will 
necessarily be superior to those implemented by a government agency, however. For example, some point to the 
government regulation of food labels as a big success. See Marian Neuhouser, Alan Kristal & Ruth Patterson, 
Use of Food Nutrition Labels is Associated with Lower Fat Intake, 99 J. OF THE AM. DIETETIC ASSOCIATION 45, 
45-53 (1999). Nonetheless, in situations where the marketplace is changing at a rapid pace, the onus should be 
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leader is Educational Testing Services (ETS), which provides a standard measure for evaluating 
college applicants.  
B.  Product Safety Testing 
The product safety testing industry is dominated by Underwriters Laboratories. 
Founded in 1894 by electrician William H. Merrill and officially incorporated in 1901, 
Underwriters Laboratories has operated for over one hundred years as a privately held product 
safety testing and certification company.
168 Like other ratings companies, UL provides an 
independent, standardized, third-party assessment for the quality of products.
169 In the mid 
1890s, insurance companies were having difficulty determining the fire risks associated with 
newly burgeoning electrical appliances. UL emerged to provide an independent test-based 
assessment of those hazards, later expanding to test and certify over 19,000 types of 
products.
170 Approval is sometimes conditioned on a manufacturer issuing warning labels, use-
and-care booklets, and other safety information for consumers.
171 UL has no vested interest in 
any of the products it certifies, and thus provides an impartial assessment. As one article notes, 
“With contracts representing billions of dollars at stake there is no room for prejudice and no 
room for superficial judgment.”
172 
Obtaining UL or any other tester’s certification is largely voluntary. The rating 
company’s testing procedures and standards are not regulated in any way. For certain narrow 
products like workplace electrical products, private testing companies must follow government 
established testing standards, but ratings firms could also decide not to test those particular 
products. Companies choose to submit their products for testing, and pay directly for that 
testing. They do so to enhance the sales of their products––the UL label is often sought out by 
                                                 
168 See Underwriters Laboratories, Inc, at http://www.ul.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). See also, Harry Chase 
Brearly,  A Symbol of Safety: The Origins of Underwriters’ Laboratories, in REPUTATION:  STUDIES IN THE 
VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT (Daniel B. Klein, ed., 1997). 
169 In another respect, UL is analogous to the MRC in that it provides a certification service, the UL label, which is 
paid for by manufacturers.  
170 See UL, About UL, at http://www.ul.com/about/ (last visited Sep. 29, 2005). 
171  Noel Campbell, Replace FDA Regulation of Medical Devices with Third-Party Certification (Cato Policy 
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distributors, retailers, and consumers
173––and to help reduce exposure to product liability 
lawsuits.
174  
For many years UL operated as the sole private sector product safety tester in the 
United States. Starting in the 1980s, as the number of electrical products seeking testing grew 
and as demand for certification among consumers increased, competitors to Underwriters Lab 
entered the testing market. Today, Intertek Testing Services, N.A. (ITSNA), formerly known as 
Electronics Testing Laboratories (ETL), and Met Electrical Testing (MET) both have made 
significant inroads into the market.
175 Nonetheless, UL still holds a revenue share of between 
50% and 60%.
176  
Government regulations appear to have contributed to UL’s continued prominence. At 
least 2,700 municipal, city, and state governments within the United States mandate safety 
certifications on certain products either sold or installed within their jurisdictions.
177 These 
governments typically only accept “recognized” certifiers, and some even mentioned UL by 
name. The situation is reminiscent of bond ratings. Corporations wishing to issue bonds want to 
ensure that those bonds are available to the widest possible audience of buyers. They, thus, seek 
bond ratings from ratings firms approved by the SEC so that national banks can bid on their 
bonds.  Likewise, manufacturing companies seek product testing certifications from recognized 
raters so their products are available to the widest set of jurisdictions. As a result, approval 
rules in product safety testing raise barriers to entry and have likely contributed to UL’s market 
dominance, just as they have limited entry in bond ratings. 
                                                                                                                                                           
172 Harry Chase Brearly, A Symbol of Safety: The Origins of Underwriters’ Laboratories, in REPUTATION: STUDIES 
IN THE VOLUNTARY ELICITATION OF GOOD CONDUCT 78 (Daniel B. Klein, ed., 1997).  
173 See Steven P. Galante, Small Labs Chip Away at UL in Market for Product Testing, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 
1986.  
174 Brearly, supra note 172. 
175  While public information on relative shares in the product safety testing market is not available, in 2004 
Intertek Testing Services, N.A. reported a little over 40,000 certified products and MET Laboratories reported 
tens of thousands of certified products; according to company correspondence. However, such numbers are still 
far from Underwriters Laboratories’ count of 19 billion UL certified products on the market in 2004.  See 
Intertek Testing Services, N.A., at  http://www.intertek.com/etlsemko?a=5441 (last visited Nov. 14, 2005); 
Underwriters Laboratories, at http://www.ul.com/about/index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2005). 
176 Allison, supra note 159. 
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Some scholars claim that the product safety certification’s process residing in the 
private sector enhances its value. To illustrate why, one scholar compares UL and similar 
organizations with the government-run Federal Aviation Administration.
178 The FAA does not 
have enough personnel to inspect all pilots and airlines––a common complaint among 
government regulatory agencies. Instead, the FAA relies on the airlines themselves to report 
whether they are meeting the agency’s regulatory guidelines. Moreover, even when airlines are 
not in compliance, the FAA often allows them to continue operations––as it did with Aloha 
Airlines in 1988, ValueJet in the mid 1990s,
179 and Alaska Airlines in 2000. Underwriters Lab, 
on the other hand, conducts all its own testing and handles all of the factory inspections with its 
own engineers. It does not trust manufacturer representations of quality. If companies do not 
meet the relevant UL standards, those companies do not receive certification. Labels can even 
be revoked if quality deteriorates over time. One scholar notes that “a private sector firm 
…looks more closely at the firms it regulates than the FAA looks at aircraft and pilots.”
180 
Product safety evaluation companies, nonetheless, do confront standard issues in 
assessing quality. Similar to media ratings companies, they must decide on appropriate 
approaches for testing. Just as no sample is ever a perfect reflection of the underlying census of 
people, no product is ever perfectly safe. One article observes, “UL official Drengenberg noted 
that ‘It would be very easy for us to come up with an overly strict standard,’ but then no one 
could afford to buy the product.”
181 Or, even if they could afford it, they would not want it. For 
example, UL once built a completely fireproof office for several of its employees.
182 The room 
had ceramic tiles on the walls and ceiling, a thick concrete floor, and metal furniture. It was 
quite expensive to build, and quite uncomfortable to use.  
                                                 
178 See Randall G. Holcombe, Eliminating Scope of Practice and Licensing Laws to Improve Health Care, 31 AM. 
SOC’Y OF L., MED. & ETHICS (2003), at 5.  
179 In fact, it took the 1996 Florida Everglades crash to force the FAA into shutting down ValueJet. See Holcombe, 
supra note 173, at 6. 
180 Holcombe, supra note 173, at 5. 
181 Mark Thornton, The Market for Safety, Ludwig von Mises Institute Free Market Newsletter, available at 
http://www.westga.edu/~bquest/1996/uwlab.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
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Instead of absolute standards, then, the safety ratings companies strive for realistic 
standards that balance safety with cost and usability. Companies are free to exceed UL’s or 
other testers’ standards, and according to time-tested economic theory, they will do so if 
consumers will pay for the resulting higher quality product.
183 This kind of balance is an issue 
in a number of ratings settings. Because people may differ on how to strike this balance in 
setting standards, interested parties may contest them in the political arena. The need for 
balance, however, should not be confused with a need for regulation.   
C.  Educational Measurement  
While a number of firms provide student measurement services for various educational 
levels, only a few provide college entrance exams. Educational Testing Services (ETS) and 
American College Test (ACT) design and administer tests as a means of evaluating a person’s 
aptitude and achievement levels for use in college entrance or employment decisions.
184 For 
example, ETS designs and administers entrance exams for college and graduate school, along 
with teacher certification tests and tests for English as a foreign language. While high school 
grades and other observable indicators of performance can be very informative, these indices 
vary widely from school to school and region to region. Educators wanted a standardized 
means of comparing students so that they could make better-informed admissions decisions. 
National exams administered by third parties provide that standardization. The measurement 
firms do not determine what a passing grade is for these tests. The thresholds are usually 
established by the colleges and universities or the state agencies that use the tests.
185  
Educational Testing Services is the dominant provider for a number of individual 
aptitude tests. ETS is a private, nonprofit organization established shortly after World War II by 
James Bryant Conant.
186 The organization’s best-known product is the Scholastic Aptitude 
                                                 
183 KATZ & ROSEN, supra note 53, at 10-17. 
184 Some states like Texas offer additional college admissions tests. The Texas Higher Education Assessment test, 
for example, is required for those students who wish to enter a Texas public college or university. It is designed 
to assess the readiness of high school graduates entering college level classes. See THEA, Program Overview, 
http://www.thea.nesinc.com/index.asp (last visited Oct. 3, 2005). 
185 ETS, Frequently Asked Questions About ETS, at http://www.ets.org/faq.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 









187  About three-fourths of U.S. high school students who wish to go to college 
take the SAT. Of the 1.8 million high school seniors that entered college in the fall of 2004, 
roughly 1.4 million took the SAT.
188  
As with the other evaluation industries examined thus far, little competition exists in 
educational testing. For college entrance exams, the American College Test (ACT) is the 
SAT’s primary competitor, but fewer students take the ACT. Just as with media ratings, 
industry concentration has led to some claims that ETS holds an illegal monopoly.
189 By U.S. 
law, holding a monopoly is not illegal per se; gaining that monopoly by illegal means or 
abusing monopoly power is.
190 These finer points can sometimes be lost in political debates 
over regulation, where the mere mention of a monopoly can be enough to rally support against 
a firm. Regardless of ETS’s monopoly status, however, not everyone appears to view their 
services as indispensable. California, Texas, and Florida are all considering dropping the SAT 
as a requirement for state college applications.
191 Thus, even when few direct rivals exist for a 
rater, demand-side responsiveness can provide market pressure. 
ETS has faced another challenge reminiscent of the present media ratings controversy 
as well. In particular, the SAT has been challenged as “both culturally and statistically biased 
against African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Asian Americans.”
192 One of the 
proponents of this view, however, notes that ETS is already doing what it can to address what 
is a fundamental problem with all standardized testing:  
                                                 
187 Note that ETS did not create the SAT. The test was invented by Carl Brigham in 1926 while he was a professor 
at Princeton University. He based it on an intelligence test administered to American soldiers during World War 
I. ETS was, however, instrumental in the widespread adoption of the SAT among colleges. Alice Gromstyn, The 
SATs: Admissions Test for Life?, THE DARTMOUTH, May 16, 2000. 
188 The Bureau of Labor Statistics, College enrollment of 2004 high school grads, 
http://stat.bls.gov/opub/ted/2005/mar/wk4/art02.htm (Originally published Mar. 29, 2005); The College Board, 
at http://www.collegeboard.com/press/article/0,,46851,00.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2005). 
189 See, e.g., the lawsuits described in National School Boards Association, Teaching candidates sue testing 
company over mistakenly issued failing grades on licensing exam that cost them their positions, LEGAL CLIPS. 
August 2004, at  
http://notes.nassmc.org/NBSfile04.nsf/0/f26ab2e64a7a5b1985256eeb0065227b?OpenDocument.  
190 FTC, MAINTAINING O R C REATING A MONOPOLY,  at  http://www.ftc.gov/bc/compguide/maintain.htm (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
191 Roy O. Freedle, Correcting the SAT’s ethnic and social-class bias: A method for reestimating SAT scores, 73 
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For many years, before each new test is compiled, a strong and in many ways 
admirable effort has been made by ETS and the College Board to help identify 
individual items that produce very large ethnic differences…[but] one cannot 
fully erase the pervasive influence of cultural linguistic background…
193 
Just as question wording is entwined with “cultural linguistic background,” certain 
sampling issues for media ratings measurement appear entwined with ethnic and racial factors. 
For example, younger and larger households generally have more television sets and thus have 
a higher incidence of dropping out of the ratings sample due to meter equipment problems. The 
younger and larger households also happen to be more prevalent among African Americans and 
Hispanics.
194 The two factors are thus confounded. The important point, for either media 
ratings or aptitude testing, is that statistics can be misleading. It is important to understand all 
of the factors underlying the data before drawing any conclusions.  
Despite the controversy over educational testing, and the stakes involved, this ratings 
industry is not regulated. Intermediaries like educational testing firms provide a service that is 
valuable only so long as it is useful. It is yet another example of a concentrated ratings market 
that appears to be well functioning, albeit with the inevitable conflicts between consumers and 
suppliers.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has provided a framework for analyzing the regulation of ratings firms. We 
began with three questions: first, is there a market failure?; second, is there a reasonable plan to 
address the alleged failure?; and third, are the benefits of the proposed policy likely to justify 
the costs? We used two recent debates, one centered on regulating media ratings and another on 
revising regulations for credit and bond raters, as our primary case studies for evaluating the 
regulation of ratings firms. While the proposed plan for intervening in the media ratings market 
                                                                                                                                                           
192 Id. at 1. 
193 Id. at 13. 
194  See Nielsen Media Research, Press Release: Nielsen Reports Declines in Fault Rates, (June 16, 2005), 
available at http://www.nielsenmedia.com/newsreleases/2005/Fault%20Rates%20Down%206-16-05.pdf; Reply 
from Nielsen Media Research to Post-Hearing Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Lautenberg, 
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appears workable in theory, we find that it is unlikely to make economic sense because there is 
no clear evidence of a market failure and because the probable costs of the regulation would 
outweigh the probable benefits. In credit and bond ratings, the market failure is clear, but 
previous solutions have exacerbated some problems and resulted in government failures. The 
proposed legislative solution for bond ratings may not go far enough, but would at least be a 
step in the right direction. 
We then considered the regulation of other kinds of rating industries. As a start, we 
characterized the economic and regulatory environment in which rating firms operate. One 
finding was that many private ratings industries are highly concentrated. Some factors that 
could increase concentration in ratings industries include economies of scale, reductions in 
transaction costs by having a single standard, and marketplace agreement on what should be 
measured. A second finding was that relatively few of the industries we reviewed are subject to 
government regulation. In some industries, especially in finance, the government restricts entry. 
Furthermore, self-governing oversight bodies are relatively rare, found primarily in television 
and radio, along with advisory ratings for movies and video games. Finally, most rating firms 
determine their own testing standards and methods. 
We next examined two other ratings industries in detail: product safety testing and 
educational achievement measurement. In general, we found little evidence of direct 
government regulation in either of these two ratings industries. While the government sets the 
standards that private companies must use in testing electrical safety in the workplace, private 
safety testers such as UL set the evaluation criteria for the vast majority of the products they 
test. At the same time, regulations specifying the product safety ratings that government 
agencies can accept appear to have contributed to market concentration among raters. This is 
the case with credit and bond ratings as well as product safety testing. 
Even though we find that government regulation of ratings firms is not likely to be 
socially beneficial in many settings, we still maintain that there is an important role for 
government in setting some kinds of standards. Based on the framework applied in this paper, 
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regulation is required in cases where there are clear market failures that private ratings firms 
may not adequately address. For example, in markets with serious externalities or coordination 
problems and pollution-creating manufacturing, government intervention in the provision of 
ratings can be justified. Moreover, the standard antitrust laws should apply to ratings firms just 
as they do for other firms in the economy. Market concentration may be the norm among raters, 
but potential abuses of market power should be monitored closely. 
The fact that our analysis reveals certain similarities across different ratings industries 
raises a number of important research issues. First, empirical research aimed at better 
understanding the reasons behind market concentration is needed. Second, it would be useful to 
know when industry oversight bodies could improve on rating services provided to consumers 
and producers by private firms. That is, could other industries besides media ratings benefit 
from groups like the MRC? Third, it is worth identifying situations where the private sector as 
opposed to the government is in a better position to set measurement criteria.
195 Currently, the 
government rates airline safety and meat quality, to name two examples. Would those tasks, 
and others, be better handled by the private sector? In the end, we think that there are not 
always simple answers to which institution should design a measurement standard, but 
guidelines might emerge, which makes the question worth asking. Finally, a more refined 
economic theory of the structure of ratings could inform empirical work, and possibly offer 
some insights into the optimal regulation of ratings firms.  
                                                 
195 A full-blown treatment of this issue would consider a number of organizational forms within the private sector, 
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VI.  APPENDIX TO TABLE 1  
Industry Sources 
Media  •  Arbitron, http://www.arbitron.com/home/content.stm (last visited Sept. 29, 
2005). 
 
•  Entertainment Software Ratings Board, http://www.esrb.org/ (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  Motion Picture Association of America, 
http://www.mpaa.org/movieratings/about/index.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 
2005). 
 
•  Nielsen Media Research, http://www.nielsenmedia.com/ (last visited Sept. 
29, 2005). 
 
Healthcare  •  Community Health Accreditation Program, http://www.chapinc.org/ (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2005). 
 
•  Department of Health and Human Services, Improving Health Care 
Quality: A Guide for Patients and Families, (Oct. 2000), at 
http://www.ahrq.gov/consumer/qntlite/qntlite.htm (AHRQ Publication No. 
01-0004). 
 
•  Elaine Zablocki, Seal of Approval, 15 MANAGED HEALTHCARE. June 1, 
2005, at 30. 
 
•  Frederick P. Franko, Health Policy Issues, AORN J., June 2002, at 
http://www.aorn.org/journal/2002/junehpi.htm 
 
•  HealthGrades, http://www.healthgrades.com/ (last visited Sept 29, 2005). 
 
•  HealthShare Technology, http://www.healthshare.com/index.asp (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, 
http://www.jcaho.org (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  Leapfrog Group, http://www.leapfroggroup.org/ (last visited Sept. 29, 
2005). 
 
•  National Committee for Quality Assurance, http://www.ncqa.org (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 









Finance  •  Consumer Reports,  http://www.consumerreports.org (last visited Oct. 28, 
2005). 
 
•  Fitch Ratings, http://fitchratings.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/funds/ (last visited October 28, 2005). 
 
•  Institutional Investor, http://www.iinews.com/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  Isabelle Lindenmayer, Innovis’ Goal: Complete with Big 3 Credit Bureaus, 
170 AMERICAN BANKER, Sept. 2005, at 7. 
 
•  Lipper, http://www.lipperweb.com/index.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2005). 
 
•  Moodys, http://www.moodys.com/cust/default.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 
2005). 
 
•  Securities and Exchange Commission, Concept Release: Rating Agencies 
and the Use of Credit Ratings under the Federal Securities Laws, available 
at  http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/33-8236.htm (last modified June 10, 
2003). 
 
•  SHADOW FINANCIAL REGULATORY COMMITTEE, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 
INSTITUTE, SEC STANDARDS FOR DESIGNATING NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED 
CREDIT RATING ORGANIZATIONS, Dec. 9, 2002, available at 
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.25,filter.all/pub_detail.asp (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  Standard and Poor’s, http://www.standardandpoors.com/ (last visited Sept. 
29, 2005). 
 
•  Robert Reid, Learn About the Markets, Institutional Investor Rankings 
Matter, BRIEFING.COM, 
http://www.briefing.com/GeneralInfo/Features/LearningCenter/edu_Institutio
nal_Investor.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  Morningstar, http://www.morningstar.com/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  Value Line, http://www.valueline.com/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 













Education  •  American College Testing, http://www.act.org (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  Barron’s, http://www.barronseduc.com/school-guides-undergraduate.html 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  CTB McGraw-Hill, http://www.ctb.com/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  Educational Testing Service, http://www.ets.org (last visited Sept. 29, 
2005). 
 
•  Harcourt, http://www.harcourt.com/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  Karen DeMasters, ETS toils through a testing time, BUS. NEWS N.J., Oct. 6, 
1997, at 1. 
 
•  NCS Pearson, http://www.ncspearson.com/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  Paige Austin, Elizabeth Green, Avi Zenilman & Brian Beutler, The 
Washington Monthly College Guide, WASHINGTON MONTHLY. (Sept. 
2005), available at 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2005/0509.collegeguide.html 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  PBS, The Testing Industry’s Big Four, at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/schools/testing/companies.ht
ml (last visited on Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  Princeton Review, FAQ about The Best 361 Colleges and The Princeton 
Review College Rankings, at 
http://www.princetonreview.com/college/research/articles/find/rankingsFAQ.
asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  Riverside Publishing, http://www.riverpub.com/ (last visited Sept. 29, 
2005). 
 
•  U.S. News & World Report, 



















•  BITS Financial Services Security Labs, 
http://bitsinfo.org/c_certification.html (Nov. 10, 2005). 
 
•  Consumer Reports, http://www.consumerreports.org/ (Oct. 28, 2005). 
 
•  eBay, Graded Sports Cards Buying Guide, 
http://pages.ebay.com/buy/guides/graded-sports-cards-buying-guide/ (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  Ginger Jin, Andrew Kato, & John List, That’s News to Me! Information 
Revelation in Professional Certification Markets (January 2000) (Working 
paper. 
 
•  Good Housekeeping, What’s Behind the Good Housekeeping Seal?, 
http://magazines.ivillage.com/goodhousekeeping/consumer/institute/articles/
0,,284512_596441,00.html (last visited Sept 29, 2005). 
 
•  Heather Williams, Crash tests for dummies: IIHS and NHTSA ratings 
explained, INSURE.COM, 
http://info.insure.com/auto/collision/crashtestbasics.html (Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  ICSA Labs, http://www.icsalabs.com/icsa/icsahome.php (last visited Nov. 
10, 2005). 
 
•  Melissa Allison, Underwriters Labs puts change to test, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, 
May 5, 2003 at 1. 
 
•  National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Department of 
Transportation, Other crash test sites, 
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/testing/ncap/pages/ResourcesLinksOCTS.htm 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of 
Labor, Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory (NTRL), 
http://www.osha.gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/ (page last updated Sept. 12, 2005). 
 
•  Tara Baukus Mello, What Crash Test Scores Mean, EDMUNDS.COM, 
available at 
http://www.edmunds.com/ownership/safety/articles/43804/article.html (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  Underwriters Laboratories, http://www.ul.com/ (last visited Sept 29, 2005). 
 











Food/Travel  •  AAA, http://www.aaa.com/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  David Shaw, Restaurants; Matter of Taste; What the French have that 
we don’t, L.A. TIMES. May 19, 2004, at F9. 
 
•  Laura Daily, Making sense of hotel ratings, VIA, Sept. 2004, available at 
http://www.viamagazine.com/top_stories/articles/Hotel_Ratings04.asp (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  Mobil Travel Guide, http://www.mobiltravelguide.com/mtg/ (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
 
Environment  •  Errol E. Meidinger, Environmental Certification Programs and U.S. 
Environmental Law: Closer Than You May Think, 31 ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW REPORTER, 10162, 10162-10166, (2001) 
 
•  Forest Stewardship Council, http://www.fscus.org/ (last visited Sept. 29, 
2005). 
 
•  Green Seal, at http://www.greenseal.org/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
Product Testing: Energy Star, 
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=prod_development.prod_developme
nt_protect (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  Scientific Certification Systems, http://www.scscertified.com/ (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
•  The American Zoo and Aquarium Association, http://www.aza.org/ (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2005). 
 
 
 
 